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The Patenting of Tax Strategies: A Patently
Unnecessary Development
Matthew A. Melone*
There are few greater stimuli to human ingenuity than the prospect of
avoiding fiscal liability. Experience shows that under this stimulus
human ingenuity outreaches Parliamentary prescience
Lord Judge Diplock'
I. INTRODUCrION
For quite some time United States' economy has been undergoing a
transformation from an industrially based model to a post-industrial
economic regime driven by information technologies. The anecdotal
evidence of such a transformation is ubiquitous and its principal form
is the electronic communication tools by which we do our jobs. The
nature of work has been, and continues to be, altered in fundamental
and irreversible ways. First, a close nexus exists between an enter-
prise's use of information and such enterprise's profitability.2 Second,
the elevated role of information in an enterprise's success has caused
enterprise managers, for some time now, to pay increasing attention
to the importance of knowledge and the effective exploitation of such
knowledge. 3
One consequence of the increasing attention paid to knowledge and
information is the heightened importance of intellectual property
rights, particularly patents. During the past decade patent law has
played an increasingly prominent role in the software industry and has
* Matthew A. Melone, J.D., CPA, is an Associate Professor of Law at Lehigh University.
1. Commissioners of Customs & Excise v. Top Ten Promotions Ltd., 3 All E.R. 39, 69 (1969).
2. Roger E. Bohn, Measuring and Managing Technological Knowledge, 36 SLOAN MGMT.
REV. 61, 62 (1994). The author analogizes knowledge to research and development activities
and asserts that knowledge is to information what research and development is to product devel-
opment. Id. He provides an eight-stage framework for determining the parameters of knowledge
that starts with stage one, complete ignorance, and culminates with stage eight, complete knowl-
edge - a stage the author concludes is unattainable in practice. Id. at 62-64.
3. See generally Stanley F. Slater & John C. Narver, Market Orientation and the Learning
Organization, 59 J. MARKETING 63 (1995); PETER F. DRUCKER, POsT-CAPITALIST SOCIETY
(1993); Rashi Glazer, Marketing in an Information-Intensive Environment: Strategic Implications
of Knowledge as an Asset, 55 J. MARKETING 1 (1991); PETER M. SENGE, THE FIFTH DISCIPLINE:
THE ART AND PRACTICE OF THE LEARNING ORGANIZATION (1990); Ray Stata, Organizational
Learning - the Key Management Innovation, 30 SLOAN MGMT. REV. 63 (1989).
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staked a claim for itself in most of the commercial world as a result of
patent issuances for business methods. A relatively recent develop-
ment is the issuance of patents for tax strategies.4
Part I of this article provides an overview of patent law subject mat-
ter eligibility. This part examines the statutory framework for patent
eligibility and the case law interpreting that framework. Also ex-
amined is the legal landscape with respect to business method patents,
a subclass of which encompasses tax strategy patents. Part II discusses
tax strategy patents and presents the argument that patent law has no
place in the tax strategy area. This argument is supported principally
on utilitarian grounds. The costs associated with the issuance of such
patents outweigh the benefits to be gained by such patents. However,
a further argument, not rooted in utilitarianism, is that the law should
not be considered appropriate subject matter for a patent. This argu-
ment recognizes the law as a uniquely public good that belongs to the
commons.
I come to this issue from the standpoint of a tax lawyer. Perhaps a
patent lawyer views the world through a different prism. However,
instinctively, as a lawyer, the notion that proprietary rights can exist
with respect to the law itself is deeply unsettling. I am fairly certain
that the issuance of patents covering methods of doing business has
proven just as unsettling to many businesspersons as has the issuance
of software patents to software developers. That said, tax law, as pat-
entable subject matter, presents unique issues that warrant the carve-
out of a categorical exception to subject matter eligibility.
II. PATENT LAW
A. In General
1. Policy and the Law
A system of free enterprise underpins the economy of the United
States. Many supporters of free enterprise dispense with the niceties
of utilitarian calculations and consider such a system desirable for its
own sake. To a degree, free enterprise implicates notions of individual
liberty and, to that extent, perhaps support of a system of free enter-
prise may be rooted in something more than utilitarian calculation.
For the most part, however, free enterprise is desirable because of
what such a system can yield for society, namely a higher standard of
living. The innovation and concomitant increases in productivity that
are generated by a system of free enterprise outweigh the costs inher-
4. Floyd Norris, You Can't Use That Tax Idea. It's Patented, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 2006, at C1.
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ent in such a system, including the opportunity costs associated with
foregoing alternative forms of ordering resources. The current stan-
dard of living in the United States would be incomprehensible to a
person born in the eighteenth century.
Competition fosters innovation. Anticompetitive behavior is po-
liced by robust antitrust enforcement. Patent policy is rooted in utili-
tarianism and shares the same objective with antitrust policy-the
promotion of consumer welfare over time.5 Antitrust and patent laws
''are complementary efforts to promote an efficient marketplace and
long-run, dynamic competition through innovation."'6 Despite the oc-
casional resort to Lockean notions of property rights and other non-
utilitarian justifications, patent law is designed to create an environ-
ment in which innovation can flourish.7
The exclusivity to make, sell, and use an invention for a period of
time provides encouragement to inventors to undertake the expendi-
ture of time and money necessary to develop ideas into inventions.
This encouragement is necessary because free rider problems are
acute with intellectual property. Unlike tangible property, intellectual
property is non-rivalrous. One person's use of such property does not
inhibit the ability of others to use the same property. Misappropria-
tion is difficult to prevent and, as a consequence, inventors' incentives
to invest are diminished. 8 The right to exclude others carries with it a
corresponding obligation of disclosure. The patent holder must,
among other disclosure requirements, disclose the invention in a man-
5. See To PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW
AND POLICY, 7 (F.T.C. Oct. 2003) [hereinafter F.T.C. Report]. Encouragement of innovation is
not limited to antitrust and patent law. Federal tax policy, for example, also promotes innova-
tion. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 41 (2006) (providing an income tax credit for research and development
activities); I.R.C. § 45C (2006) (providing an income tax credit for clinical testing for certain
drugs to treat rare diseases or conditions); I.R.C. § 174 (2006) (allowing a deduction for research
and experimentation expenditures).
6. See id. (quoting 1 HERBERT HOVENKAMP ET AL., IP AND ANTITRUST: AN ANALYSIS OF
ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES APPLIED TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW § 13 (2002)). See F.T.C. Re-
port, supra note 5, at 14-23 for a historical analysis of the coexistence of patent and antitrust law.
Antitrust concerns may be raised by the methods by which patent holders employ their patents.
For example, conditioning the grant of a license to a licensee's promise to purchase non-patented
products from the patent holder may violate antitrust laws as may the refusal, in certain circum-
stances, by a patent holder to grant a license. See Janice M. Mueller, Patent Misuse Through the
Capture of Industry Standards, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 623, 673-82 (2002).
7. See Nari Lee, Patent Eligible Subject Matter Reconfiguration and the Emergence of
Proprietarian Norms - The Patent Eligibility of Business Methods, 45 IDEA 321, 352-54 (2005).
8. See, e.g., Samuel A. Oddi, Un-Unified Economic Theories of Patents - The Not-Quite-Holy-
Grail, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 267 (1996); Edmund Kitch, The Nature and Function of the
Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265 (1977); ROGER E. SCHECTER & JOHN R. THOMAS, INTEL-
LECTUAL PROPERTY: THE LAW OF COPYRIGHTS, PATENTS, AND TRADEMARK 288 (2003).
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ner such that a person skilled in the art in question can make and use
the invention without undergoing significant experimentation. 9
There are costs associated with the patent system. Although patent
and antitrust law share objectives, their respective approaches in at-
taining their objectives differ markedly. Antitrust is "concerned
about conduct that in the short term may be benign or helpful to con-
sumers, but that may be harmful in the long run, whereas in the patent
regime we tolerate immediate consumer harm ... in the expectation
that it in the long run it will benefit consumers. .. "10
Exclusive property rights can lead to suboptimal use of the prop-
erty. Knowledge creation may be stifled if the holders of exclusive
rights behave opportunistically and non-cooperatively - what one
scholar has termed the Hobbes theorem.1 Moreover, exclusivity
grants a monopoly to the patent holder and, in general, monopolists
produce sub-optimal output in comparison to the output that would
have been produced in a competitive market.12 Patents have also
been criticized as an infringement on economic liberty.13
Substantive limits on patent protection are meant to ensure that the
costs associated with patents do not outweigh their benefits. "From
their inception, the federal patent laws have embodied a careful bal-
ance between the need to promote innovation and the recognition
9. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000). See also J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l., Inc., 534
U.S. 124, 142 (2001) (citing Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 484 (1974) in terming
the disclosure requirement as the "quid pro quo" of the right to exclude). The patent must also
describe the claims made by the inventor, the manner and process if making and using the inven-
tion, and the best mode known to the inventor for carrying out the invention. See 35 U.S.C.
§§ 111-112 (2000).
10. F.T.C Report, supra note 5, at 7 n.46 (quoting Thomas B. Leary's remarks during the
A.B.A. Section of Antitrust Law Program in Philadelphia, Pa. on May 3, 2001). For example,
Microsoft Corporation's long running antitrust battle with the Justice Dept. involved, among
other issues, the bundling of software features within the Windows operating system. Arguably,
in the short run, consumers benefited from the convenience offered by such bundling. In the
long run, however, Microsoft's domination of the market for operating systems could have re-
sulted in its similar domination of markets for other software resulting in higher prices for con-
sumers and less product choice.
11. See Lee, supra note 7, at 355. This theorem stands in contrast to the famous Coase theo-
rem under which one could expect bargaining to take place leading to the commercialization of
patented subject matter. Patent holders often engage in behavior that may be considered
Hobbesian. Patent hold-ups can occur when a patent holder extracts a high price for granting a
license to a licensee that has significant sunk costs whose utility depends on obtaining a license.
Patent holders may also build fences to prevent entry into a market. See generally F.T.C. Report,
supra note 5, at 28-35.
12. See infra notes 168-73 and accompanying text.
13. See Jay Dratler, Jr., Alice in Wonderland Meets the U.S. Patent System, 38 AKRON L. REv.
299, 302-04 (2005). Others argue that patents do not restrict individual liberty because the liberty
related to the use of an invention would not have existed without the invention. See Lee, supra
note 7, at 353 n.127 (citing ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 181-82 (1974)).
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that imitation and refinement through imitation are both necessary to
invention itself and the very lifeblood of a competitive economy."'14
The Constitution authorizes Congress "[t]o promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discov-
eries."1 5 The first patent legislation was enacted in 1790 and the cur-
rent statutory scheme is the result of the Patent Act of 1952.16 The
United States, in contrast to other countries, grants patents under a
first-to-invent standard rather than under a first-to-file standard.1 7
The law encourages rapid filings by inventors because a patent will
not be granted if the invention was described in a printed publication,
in public use, or on sale in the United States more than one year prior
to the date of application. 18 This provision will cause inventors to
carefully consider the commercial advantages of deploying their in-
vention in secret versus the possibility that patent protection may be-
come unavailable. 19
In general, patent applications must be published after the expira-
tion of a period of 18 months from the earliest filing date for which a
benefit is sought.20 However, an applicant may opt out of this re-
quirement by certifying that the invention disclosed in the application
has not, and will not, be the subject of an application in another coun-
try or under a multilateral agreement that requires publication 18
months after filing.21 A utility patent is granted for a term that begins
on the date on which the patent is issued and ends twenty years from
the date on which the application was filed.22 Once issued, a patent
14. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 146 (1989).
15. U.S. CONST. Art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
16. Pub. L. No. 82-593, 66 Stat. 792 (1952).The original patent legislation broadened subject
matter eligibility when compared to the English Statute of Monopolies of 1623. The latter legis-
lation extended patent protection only to manufactures. The industrial revolution led to ever
expanding notions of what was patentable subject matter. See John R. Thomas, The Patenting of
the Liberal Professions, 40 B.C. L. REV. 1139, 1143-44 (1999).
17. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(g) (2000).
18. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (b) (2000).
19. The First Inventor Defense Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-113, 113 Stat. 1536 (1999) (adding
prior user rights as a defense to a patent infringement claim). However, this defense is only
available in the context of business methods patents. See infra notes 104-08 and accompanying
text.
20. 35 U.S.C. § 122(b)(1)(A) (2000).
21. 35 U.S.C. § 122(b)(2)(B)(i) (2000). An applicant may choose to publish patent applica-
tions despite the fact that foreign patent protection will not be sought because liability for in-
fringement will be accelerated to the date of publication. See 35 U.S.C. § 154(d) (Supp. 2004).
22. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2000). Maintenance fees are required to be paid three and one-half
years, seven and one-half years, and eleven and one half years after issuance. See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.20(e)-(g) (2005). See also U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, FY 2007 Fee Schedule, available
at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/qs/ope/ (last modified on Feb. 1, 2007). Extensions of a
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carries a presumption of validity that may be overcome by clear and
convincing evidence of invalidity.23
2. Patentable Subject Matter
Under current law patentable subject matter is comprised of "any
new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of
matter. ' 24  The term "process" is defined as any "process, art or
method" and includes a new use of a known process, machine, manu-
facture, or composition of matter or material.2 5 The Supreme Court
has interpreted the statute broadly based on its understanding of its
legislative history from which it gleaned Congress' intent to "include
anything under the sun that is made by man."' 26 The Federal Courts
Improvement Act of 1982 created the Court of Appeals for the Fed-
eral Circuit.27 This court, which has exclusive jurisdiction of all ap-
peals from district court decisions involving patent legislation, has also
patent's term are provided for in the case of certain administrative delays. See generally 35
U.S.C. § 154(b) (2000). The present term was enacted in 1995 to meet the obligations of the
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, commonly known as
TRIPs. See LEE BURGUNDER, LEGAL AsPEcrs OF MANAGING TECHNOLOGY 46-47 (3d ed.
2004). The United States is a party to various multilateral agreements that implicate intellectual
property. These agreements, with respect to patents, generally deal with procedural issues or
require that citizens of signatory countries receive national treatment, or reciprocal rights, under
the laws of each signatory country. See id. at 39-41. Previously, the term of a utility patent was 17
years beginning on the date of grant. Design patents, issued for inventions of new, original, and
ornamental designs of an article of manufacture, have terms of 14 years commencing on the date
of issue. 35 U.S.C. §§ 171, 173 (2000).
23. 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2000); Nystrom v. Trex Co., 424 F.3d 1136, 1149 (Fed. Cir. 2005). A pat-
ent does not confer rights to use an invention but to exclude others from doing so. Non-patent
related legal and requirements, if applicable, must be met. The patent process does not consider
such requirements. See, e.g., Juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange Bang, Inc., 185 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 1999)
(reversing the district's court invalidation of a patent and holding that whether an invention may
prove deceptive is a determination best left to others, such as the Federal Trade Commission and
the Food and Drug Administration).
24. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
25. 35 U.S.C. § 100(b) (2000).
26. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980); Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 182
(1981).
27. Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (1982). Prior to the creation of the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit appellate jurisdiction in patent cases resided in several courts. Appeals of judg-
ments regarding alleged infringement by the United States were made to the Court of Claims.
Final judgments of the Patent and Trademark Office and the International Trade Commission
were taken to the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals. The International Trade Commission
rendered decisions regarding the importation of products that allegedly infringed upon patents.
The regional appeals courts heard appeals of district court judgments involving infringement
actions against private litigants. For a historical account of various patent forums see Elizabeth I.
Rogers, The Phoenix Precedents: The Unexpected Rebirth of Regional Circuit Jurisdiction Over
Patent Appeals and the Need for a Considered Congressional Response, 16 HARV. J.L. & TECH.
411, 437 (2003).
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served to broaden patent protection. 28 Laws of nature, natural phe-
nomenon, and abstract ideas are not patentable preventing, among
other things, the patenting of algorithms and scientific truths and, for
a time, business methods. 29 However, the application of a law of na-
ture or mathematical formula may, in appropriate circumstances, be
patent eligible.30
In addition to the subject matter eligibility requirements other stat-
utory tests must be met in order to ensure the validity of a specific
patent. The most critical requirements that focus on the subject mat-
ter of the invention are utility, novelty, and nonobviousness. 31 Inven-
tions, to qualify for patent protection, must be useful.32 An invention
is useful if a person having ordinary skill in the art would recognize
that the invention would perform its articulated functions.33 Moreo-
ver, the utility of the invention, as asserted by the applicant, must be
specific and credible. These requirements force an applicant to desig-
nate a specific function that the invention performs and demonstrate
its utility in a practical setting.34
28. 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (2000). See F.T.C. Report, supra note 5, at 20-21. See also Maureen A.
O'Rourke & Joseph F. Brodley, Antitrust Implications of Patent Settlements: An Incentives Modi-
fying Approach 1 n.3 (Boston Univ. School of Law Working Paper Series, Law and Economics,
Working Paper No. 03-08, 2003) available at http://www.bu.edu/law/faculty/scholarship/
workingpapers/abstracts/2003/ORourkeM&BrodleyJO42903abstract.html (providing cites to sev-
eral surveys that estimated the percentage of patents held invalid by various courts over various
time periods); infra notes 48-50 and accompanying text (discussing the Federal Circuit's test for
nonobviousness that has had the effect of broadening patent protection for inventions that con-
sisted of combination of elements that existed in the prior art).The Federal Circuit has exclusive
jurisdiction over appeals from final decisions of district courts, if the district court jurisdiction
was based, in whole or in part, on section 1338. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) (2000). Section 1338
confers original jurisdiction to the district courts of any civil action arising under any Act of
Congress relating to patents. 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (2000). The Supreme Court has interpreted 28
U.S.C. § 1295 to deny Federal Circuit court jurisdiction in cases where the plaintiff alleged no
patent claim and the patent issue arose out of a defendant's compulsory counterclaim. See
Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc. 535 U.S. 826, 829 (2002).
29. See Diamond, 450 U.S. at 185. See also Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972) (invali-
dating a patent that involved a method of converting binary-coded decimal numerals into pure
binary numbers because the process did transform one thing into another tangible result and
that an idea is merely an abstract concept that is not patentable). For a discussion of the business
method exception and its eventual demise see infra notes 66-85 and accompanying text.
30. Diamond, 450 U.S. at 186-87.
31. Patent applications must also meet disclosure requirements imposed pursuant to 35 U.S.C.
§ 112 (2000). In general, an applicant must describe the invention so that persons skilled in the
art are able to reduce the invention to practice without undue experimentation, set forth distinct
and definite claims that set out the proprietary interest asserted by the applicant, and set forth
the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out the invention.
32. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
33. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, Revised Interim Utility Guidelines Training Material 5,
available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/menu/utility.pdf (last visited on Apr. 9, 2007).
34. Id.
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The principle that patent protection is reserved for new innovation
is manifested in the novelty requirement. Several statutory tests are
set forth including whether the invention was known or used by others
in the United States or patented or described in a printed publication
in the United States or a foreign country before it was invented by the
applicant.35 Moreover, a patent application may not filed more than
one year from the date the invention was patented or described in a
printed publication in the United States or a foreign country or in
public use or on sale in the United States. 36 This requirement pre-
vents an inventor from intentionally delaying the beginning of the pat-
ent term without foregoing the commercial exploitation of the
invention. Inventors are under no duty to apply for a patent. How-
ever, by selling the product or service that embodies the invention
they may forfeit patent protection. Moreover, patent protection may
be denied to others because a patent will not be issued if another in-
ventor previously and independently conceived of the invention and,
without having abandoned, suppressed, or concealed the invention,
reduced it practice. 37
Not all things new, however, merit patent protection. In addition to
the standards of novelty an invention must also be non-obvious. This
requirement demarcates "a line between the things that are worth the
public embarrassment of an exclusive patent, and those which are
not.' '38 The Supreme Court established the non-obvious requirement
in 1851 by holding that a patent requires more skill and ingenuity than
that of "an ordinary mechanic acquainted with the business." 39 This
requirement, codified in Section 103, provides that a patent may not
35. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000). A patent application may not be filed more than one year from
the date of a publication in any country disclosing the invention or public use of the invention.
Id. Exceptions are made for certain experimental uses of an invention. See generally Allen Eng'g
v. Bartell Indus. Inc., 299 F.3d 1336, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
36. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000). The Supreme Court has interpreted this provision liberally and
held that the one year time period begins to run when a product is the subject of a commercial
offer for sale and is ready for patenting. See Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55 (1998).
37. 35 U.S.C. § 102(g) (2000). See also Dow Chem. Co. v. Astro-Valcour, Inc., 267 F.3d 1334
(Fed. Cir. 2001) (denying the validity of a patent because an earlier inventor undertook continu-
ous efforts to commercialize the invention); Dunlop Holdings Ltd. v. Ram Golf Corp., 524 F.2d.
33 (7th Cir. 1975) (holding that the marketing and sale of golf balls without disclosure of a
particular ingredient used in their manufacture did not amount to suppression or concealment).
A patent will not be issued for an invention on which the inventor had abandoned her intention
to obtain a patent. 35 U.S.C. § 102(c). These provision highlight the risk that inventors incur by
foregoing patent protection and, instead, preserving, or attempting to preserve, trade secret
protection.
38. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc. 489 U.S. 141, 148 (1989) (quoting Thomas
Jefferson).
39. Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. 248, 267 (1951).
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be obtained "if the differences between the subject matter sought to
be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a
whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to
a person having ordinary skill in the art .... "40 Unlike the novelty
standards this standard is less formulaic and more opaque and, ac-
cordingly, has generated a significant amount of case law.41 The stan-
dards applied in determining non-obviousness can have significant
effects on innovation. Overly restrictive standards may enhance an
initial inventor's market dominance. Alternatively, lax standards may
result in the proliferation of trivial patents, increased transaction
costs, and diminished incentives to innovate.
The review for non-obviousness is fact-intensive and requires a
thorough examination of prior art references. In Graham v. John
Deere Co.,4 2 the Supreme Court, interpreting section 103, held that a
three-part analysis is required in ascertaining whether a particular in-
vention was non-obvious. First, the scope and content of prior art are
to be ascertained.43 In general, prior art is documentary evidence in
the form of other patents and publications.44 Second, differences be-
tween the invention and prior art are to be identified. 5 Finally, the
level of ordinary skill in the relevant art is to be determined. 46 The
Court also held that, in appropriate situations, secondary considera-
tions, such as commercial success, the failures of others, and long un-
met needs, may be relevant to a determination of non-obviousness. 47
Many inventions contain elements that exist in various prior art ref-
erences. The non-obviousness requirement is particularly trouble-
some when the invention at issue results from the combination of
40. 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2000).
41. See generally Jean F. Rydstrom, Annotation, Application, and Effect of 35 U.S.C.A. 103,
Requiring Nonobvious Subject Matter in Determining Validity of Patents, 23 A.L.R. FED. 326
(2004).
42. Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1 (1966).
43. Id. at 17.
44. Prior art references may also include affadavits and testimony. See Sakraisa v. Ag Pro Inc.,
425 U.S. 273, 280 (1976).
45. Graham, 383 U.S. at 17.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 17-18. The Federal Circuit has used these secondary considerations as objective fac-
tors that may override determinations based solely on prior art considerations and must be con-
sidered before a conclusion is reached. These factors are not to be treated as "icing on the cake."
Hybritech, Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d. 1367, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 1996). The use of
the commercial success of an invention as a proxy for non-obviousness is subject to the criticism
that such commercial success is not necessarily attributable to a non-obvious innovation but may
be explained by other factors such as good marketing. See, e.g., Robert P. Merges, Commercial
Success and Patent Standards: Economic Perspectives on Innovation, 76 CAL. L. REV. 805 (1988);
Note, Subtests of "Nonobviousness": A Nontechnical Approach to Patent Validity, 112 U. PA. L.
REV. 1169 (1964).
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existing products or inventions. In an effort to prevent undue influ-
ence from the benefit of hindsight, the Federal Circuit has articulated
a test that makes a finding of obviousness more difficult in such cases.
Under this test, the fact that separate elements of an invention existed
in the prior art is insufficient to establish obviousness in the absence
of "some teaching or suggestion, in the prior art, to combine the ele-
ments."'48 Applying this test, commonly known as the "teaching-sug-
gestion-motivation test," the Federal Circuit has, on several occasions,
overturned findings of obviousness by the Patent and Trademark Of-
fice. 49 This test has proved to be controversial. Critics assert that this
test amounts to the creation of an entitlement to patent protection.
Proponents of the test counter that it is necessary because, in hind-
sight, everything appears to be obvious. The Supreme Court agreed
to join the debate by granting certiorari in KSR Int'l. Co. v. Teleflex
Inc. 5O
In a unanimous decision likely to have significant implications with
respect to the granting of business method patents, the Supreme
Court has strengthened the obviousness requirement by holding that
the Federal Circuit's inquiry into the obviousness of an invention was
too narrow as a result of its application of the teaching-suggestion-
motivation test.51 The Court stated that one of the ways in which a
patent's subject matter can be proved obvious is by noting that that
the invention encompassed an obvious solution to a known problem.
The Court did not categorically reject the use of the teaching-sugges-
tion-motivation test, but instead found several errors with the Federal
Circuit's use of the teaching-suggestion-motivation test in determining
that an invention was obvious.
First, the Federal Circuit examined only the problem the patentee
was attempting to solve. The Court held that any need or problem
known in the field of endeavor and addressed by the patent can pro-
vide a reason for combining elements.52 Second, the Federal Circuit
erroneously assumed that a person of ordinary skill will be led only to
those elements of prior art designed to solve the same problem. A
48. Arkie Lures, Inc. v. Gene Larew Tackle, Inc., 119 F.3d 954, 957 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
49. See, e.g., In re Sang-Su Lee, 277 F.3d 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2002); In re Dembiczak, 175 F.3d 994
(Fed. Cir. 1999). For a more general discussion of the favorable climate for patent validity cre-
ated by the Federal Circuit see Gerald Sobel, The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit: A
Fifth Anniversary Look at its Impact on Patent Law and Litigation, 37 AM. U. L. REV. 1087, 1089
(1988).
50. KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 126 S.Ct. 2965 (2006).
51. KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 2007 U.S. LEXIS 4745, at *39 (2007). The Court's holding
will also have broad ramifications in fields of endeavor where innovation is often incremental,
such as software.
52. Id. at *40.
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person of ordinary skill is not an "automatom" and, therefore, would
not be so limited and would "be able to fit teachings of multiple pat-
ents together like pieces of a puzzle. '53 Third, the Federal Circuit er-
roneously concluded that a patent claim may not be proved obvious
merely by showing that the combination of elements was "obvious to
try."' 54 The Court held that market pressures to solve a problem and
the existence of a finite number of identified, predictable solutions
will provide a good reason for persons of ordinary skill to pursue op-
tions.55 It is likely that any attained success that results from such
efforts is attributable to ordinary skill and common sense and not in-
novation. 56 Finally, the Court held the risk of hindsight bias does not
justify the application of rigid rules that deny the application of com-
mon sense.
57
B. Business Method Patents
The notion that patentable inventions have a physical manifestation
has been long-standing, predating the founding of the United States.58
Nineteenth century courts consistently required the presence of some
"physical tangible facility" for implementing a process or some physi-
cal result as the output of a process.5 9 Although the Patent Act of
1952 extended patent protection to processes subject matter eligibility
continued to depend, to a great extent, on some sort of physical mani-
festation. Algorithms, mental steps, and the like were viewed as ab-
stract ideas, not patentable per se. As one leading scholar noted:
The requirement of physical instantiation is not an illogical one. It
ties the relatively abstract proprietary interests created by patent
law to the corporeal things that form the traditional objects of prop-
erty. The identifiable boundaries that result better enable individu-
als to complete transactions, form markets and determine the sorts
of conduct that will be judged permissible. The stricture that
processes generate tangible results also places appropriate limits
upon infringement liability, for the courts may far more readily ob-
serve the market impact of manipulated objects than trace the effect
of more rarified teachings. In all these matters, patent law reflects
the precepts of the copyright law, which offers protection only to
works fixed in a tangible medium of expression.60
53. Id. at *40-41.
54. Id. at *41.
55. Id. at *41-42.
56. Id. at *42.
57. Id.
58. The English Statute of Monopolies of 1623 provided patent protection to "manufactures."
See Thomas, supra note 16, at 1143.
59. Id. at 1147.
60. Id. at 1147.
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The inexorable advance of technology put great strain on the patent
system's insistence that an invention exhibit traditional physical shar-
acteristics. More than two-thirds of the United States' gross domestic
product is accounted for by services and intangibles. 61 The Supreme
Court resisted the argument that the patentability of inventions in dis-
ciplines unforeseen in 1952 should be left to the Congress to decide.62
Patent applicants increasingly sought patent protection for methods
and processes that were implemented by computers. Two judicially
created exceptions, the algorithm exception and the business method
exception, began to take an increasingly prominent role in patent
jurisprudence.
1. The Algorithm Exception
The mathematical algorithm exception is a judicially created bar to
subject matter patentability that flowed from the well accepted notion
that abstract ideas are not patentable. The Supreme Court, in Gott-
schalk v. Benson,63 invalidated a patent that provided a method of con-
verting binary-coded decimal numerals into pure binary numbers. The
Court held that:
It is conceded that one may not patent an idea. But in practical ef-
fect that would be the result if the formula for converting BCD
numerals to pure binary numbers were patented.... The mathemat-
ical formula involved here has no substantial practical application
except in connection with a digital computer, which means that if
the judgment below is affirmed, the patent would wholly pre-empt
the mathematical formula and in practical effect would be a patent
on the algorithm itself.64
In a subsequent case, the Supreme Court held that the principle it
articulated in Benson was applicable if the invention itself was merely
the application of an algorithm.65 The process at issue in that case was
one that provided a better means of calculating certain limits applica-
ble to a chemical process using a known algorithm. However, in Dia-
mond v. Diehr,66 the Court held that an invention satisfies the subject
61. See Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, Measuring and Representing the Knowledge Economy: Ac-
counting for Economic Reality under the Intangibles Paradigm, 54 BUFF. L. REV. 1, 38-39 (2006).
For an interesting analysis of the effect of intangible property on business strategies see HENRY
CHESBROUGH, OPEN BUSINESS MODELS: How TO THRIVE IN THE NEW INNOVATION LAND-
SCAPE (2006), where the author categorizes enterprises into six categories based on their ability
to exploit technology and innovation.
62. See Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 315-316. The invention at issue in this case concerned genetic
technology.
63. Gottschalk, 409 U.S. at 63.
64. Thomas, supra note 16, at 1149 (citing Gottschalk, 409 U.S. at 71-72).
65. See Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978).
66. Diamond, 450 U.S. at 175.
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matter requirements of section 101 if the mathematical formula is in-
tegral to a structure or process that performs a function which the
patent laws were designed to protect. The Court held that the appli-
cant did not seek to patent a mathematical formula but a process - in
this case, a process for curing synthetic rubber-that employed a well-
known mathematical equation.
In response to an increasing number of patent applications that im-
plicated mathematical formulas as part of processes that involved a
physical structure or generated some sort of physical output, the
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals employed a two-part test to
assess the validity of these patents.67 The test, known as the Freeman-
Walter-Abele test,68 was used to determine first whether a mathemati-
cal algorithm is recited directly or indirectly in the claim. If a mathe-
matical algorithm was so recited, then a determination was made as to
whether the claimed invention was no more than the algorithm itself,
in which case, the invention failed to meet the subject matter eligibil-
ity requirement of section 101. If, however, the mathematical al-
gorithm was a step in a process, or an element in an apparatus, then
the invention met the requirements of section 101 if the process or
apparatus was eligible subject matter.69
Over a decade later the Federal Circuit appeared to eviscerate the
mathematical algorithm exception in In re Alappat.70 The patent at
issue in that case involved a mathematical algorithm that processed
data in a way that allowed information to be displayed more clearly
on a monitor. The court upheld the patentability of the process on the
grounds that the invention was "not a disembodied mathematical con-
cept which may be characterized as an 'abstract idea', but rather a
specific machine to produce a useful, concrete, and tangible result. '71
The Alappat decision is credited for bringing the debate about the pat-
entability of software to a swift conclusion. 72
67. The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals had jurisdiction over appeals of final decisions
of the Patent and Trademark Office and the International Trade Commission. See supra note 27.
68. The test is named after a series of three cases. The original formulation of the test resulted
from the court's decision in In re Freeman, 573 F. 2d 1237 (C.C.P.A. 1978). The test was later
refined in In re Walter, 618 F.2d 758 (C.C.P.A. 1980), and In re Abele, 684 F.2d 902 (C.C.P.A.
1982).
69. Arrhythmia Research Tech., Inc. v. Corazonix Corp., 958 F.2d 1053, 1058 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
70. In re Kuriappan P. Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
71. Id. at 1544.
72. See Thomas, supra note 16, at 1154-55; Brian Richard Yoshida, Claiming Electronic and
Software Technologies: The Effect of the Federal Circuit Decisions in Alappat, Warmerdam, and
Lowry on the Claiming of Mathematical Algorithms and Data Structures, 45 Buff. L. Rev. 457
(1997).
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2. The Business Method Exception
In a 1908 case, Hotel Security Checking Co. v. Lorraine Co., 73 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit invalidated a
patent that involved a method and means of preventing fraud by res-
taurant waiters and cashiers by use of a method of cash registering
and accounting. The court invalidated the patent because it found
that the technology employed would occur to anyone familiar with
business - under the current statutory regime the court would have
found the invention to be obvious. In dicta, however, the court
spawned what came to be known as the business method exception. 74
Shortly thereafter the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit upheld
the validity of a patent related to railway tickets because it found the
invention to involve a physical structure and was not merely "a
method of transacting business. '75 Additional cases followed that in-
volved business processes or methods without corresponding physical
structures and such inventions were denied patent protection. 76
It was inevitable that advances in software and computing power
would create difficulty in determining whether an invention impli-
cated the mathematical algorithm exception or the business method
exception. In Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc. v. Merrill, Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. ,77 the federal district court upheld Merrill
Lynch's patent for a cash management account system. The system
combined several common products - a securities account, a money
market account, a charge account, and a checking account. The sys-
tem provided, among other features, a method for customers to sweep
idle proceeds into a choice of interest bearing money market ac-
counts.78 The court held that the mathematical algorithm exception
73. Hotel Sec. Checking Co. v. Lorraine Co., 160 F. 467 (2d Cir. 1908).
74. The court stated that "[i]t is manifest that the subject-matter of the claims is not a ma-
chine, manufacture or composition of matter. If within the language of the statute at all, it must
be as a "new or useful art." One of the definitions given by Webster of the word 'art' is as
follows: 'The employment of means to accomplish some desired end; the adaptation of things in
the natural world to the uses of life; the application of knowledge or power to practical pur-
poses.' In the sense of the patent law, an art is not a mere abstraction. A system of transaction
business disconnected from the means of carrying out the system is not, within the most liberal
interpretation of the term, an art." Thomas, supra note 16, at 1146 (citing
Hotel Security Checking Co., 160 F. at 469).
75. Cincinnati Traction Co. v. Pope, 210 F. 443,447 (6th Cir, 1913).
76. See, e.g., In re Bolongaro, 62 F.2d 1059 (C.C.P.A. 1933); In re Sterling, 70 F.2d 910
(C.C.P.A. 1934); In re Patton (C.C.P.A. 1942).
77. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 564
F. Supp. 1358 (Del. 1983).
78. Such accounts and their modern successors have proven to be quite profitable for the
financial service industry. Enormous profits have been made by financial services firms through
the investment of customer funds at rates significantly higher than the rates paid to customers
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was inapplicable because the system did not directly or indirectly re-
cite a procedure for solving a mathematical problem. The court fur-
ther held that the invention met the subject matter eligibility
requirements because it taught "a method of operation on a computer
to effectuate a business activity."'79 In the court's view, this case
presented a software issue and not a business method issue, although
the court did note that if the same processes involved in the invention
were performed manually, the invention would not be patentable. 80
3. State Street
In 1998, the patent landscape was altered by the seminal case of
State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, Inc.81 Sig-
nature Financial held a patent, issued in 1993, on a data processing
system that implemented an investment structure that facilitated the
pooling of assets by mutual funds into an investment portfolio that
was organized as a partnership. Known as a "Hub and Spoke" struc-
ture, the pooling of assets into an investment partnership provided
economies of scale and certain income tax advantages.82 The data
processing system provided the means for allocating income, ex-
penses, realized gains and losses, and unrealized gains and losses
among the partners on a daily basis. Moreover, the system deter-
mined the book capital accounts of the partners and provided infor-
mation necessary for the periodic accounting and tax reports required
to be filed by the partnership and its partners.83
After license negotiations broke down, State Street brought a de-
claratory judgment action in federal district court and filed a motion
for partial summary judgment of patent invalidity for failure to claim
statutory subject matter under section 101. The district court granted
the motion using both the mathematical algorithm exception and the
for the use of their funds. Such practices have drawn criticism. See Randall Smith, How Wall
Street 'Sweeps' the Cash, WALL ST. J., Jan. 11, 2007, at C1.
79. Id. at 1369.
80. Id.
81. State Street Bank & Trust v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
82. The investment partnership was the "Hub" and the "Spokes" were the mutual fund part-
ners in the investment partnership. The partnership structure offers various tax advantages,
among them, the lack of an entity level tax, flexibility in allocation of income and loss, and exit
flexibility. See generally Matthew A. Melone, Corporate Partnering: The Increasing Applicability
of Subchapter K in a Subchapter C World, 16 J. TAX OF INVEST. 15 (1998).
83. Book capital accounts refer to partners' capital accounts that are maintained in accor-
dance with Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(iv) (2005). Partnerships have tremendous flexibility in
allocating tax items among partners. However, such allocations must have substantial economic
effect. See I.R.C. § 704(a)-(b) (2006). The maintenance of such accounts is one of several re-
quirements imposed by the income tax regulations to insure that allocations of income, expenses,
gains, losses, and credits among the partners have substantial economic effect.
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business method exception as grounds to invalidate the patent.84 The
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that whether a claim is
categorized as a machine claim or process claim is of little relevance in
determining subject matter eligibility.85  The court, citing
Chakrabarty, interpreted section 101 expansively. "The repetitive use
of the expansive term 'any' in § 101 shows Congress's intent not to
place any restrictions on the subject matter for which a patent may be
obtained beyond those specifically recited in § 101."86
The court then turned its attention to the mathematical algorithm
and business method exceptions. With respect to the mathematical
algorithm exception the court laid to rest the Freeman-Walter-Abele
test by holding that such test had little, if any, applicability after Diehr
and Chakrabarty.87 The court reiterated the "means test" it formu-
lated in Alappat:
As we pointed out in Alappat ... application of the test could be
misleading, because a process, machine, manufacture, or composi-
tion of matter employing a law of nature, natural phenomenon, or
abstract idea would not, by itself, be entitled to such protection. The
test determines the presence of, for example, an algorithm. Under
Benson, this may have been a sufficient indicium of nonstatutory
subject matter. However, after Diehr and Alappat, the mere fact
that a claimed invention involves inputting numbers, calculating
numbers, outputting numbers, and storing numbers, in and of itself,
would not render it nonstatutory subject matter, unless, of course,
its operation does not produce a "useful, concrete and tangible
result."88
Provided a claim performs a function that transforms or reduces an
article to a different state or thing, it is entitled to patent protection
despite the fact that it implements or applies a mathematical
formula. 89
The court then addressed the business method exception. The busi-
ness method exception, in the court's view, was not a stand-alone ex-
ception at all and invocation of this exception was always preceded by
a ruling based on a clearer concept such as the application of the ab-
84. State Street Bank & Trust v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 927 F. Supp. 502 (D. Mass. 1996).
85. State Street, 149 F.3d. at 1372. The court also noted, in dicta, that the judicially created
exceptions should be applicable to all categories of subject matter. Id. at 1372 n.1.
86. Id. at 1373. Section 101 provides that '[w]hoever invents or discovers any new or useful
process, machine,... or any new or useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefore
.. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000) (emphasis provided).
87. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
88. Id. at 1374 (references omitted).
89. Id. at 1375. The court interpreted Hotel Security Checking Co. v. Lorraine, discussed at
supra note 73 and accompanying text, as a decision that turned on lack of novelty and invention
and not on ineligible subject matter. Id. at 1376.
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stract idea exception based on finding a mathematical algorithm. 90
The court took the "opportunity to lay this ill-conceived exception to
rest." 91 Leaving no doubt that this exception had no further applica-
tion in determining subject matter eligibility, the court went on to
state that this exception "is an unwarranted encumbrance to the defi-
nition of statutory subject matter" and should "be discarded as error-
prone, redundant, and obsolete. '92
4. Post-State Street Criticism and Responses
After State Street, business method claims were to be treated in a
manner similar to any other process claims. 93 Several high profile
cases followed, including AT&T Corp. v. Excel Communications94 and
Amazon.com, Inc. v. Barnesandnoble.com, Inc.95 The immediate con-
sequence of the State Street decision was a marked increase in patent
applications. In the year 2000, the number of business method appli-
cations increased approximately 700 percent from the number of such
applications filed in 1997.96 Certain industries, such as the financial
services industry, were particularly affected by a perception that there
existed "a gold-rush mentality toward patents and litigation. '97 As a
consequence, the issuance of patents on business methods came under
swift, varied, and vociferous criticism. 98
90. Id. at 1375.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. In general, European and Japanese patent authorities do not recognize business method
claims as patentable. Some sort of physical instantiation is required. See generally Lee, supra
note 7.
94. AT&T Corp. v. Excel Commc'ns, 172 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 1999). The invention at issue
involved the use of a mathematical algorithm to automatically route phone calls to a long dis-
tance carrier. The court reversed the district court's finding of invalidity, which was based on the
mathematical algorithm exception.
95. Amazon.com, Inc. v. Barnesandnoble.com, Inc., 239 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2001). This case
involved Amazon's well known "one-click" system for placing on-line orders. Amazon brought
an infringement suit against Barnes and Noble, alleging that its use of a similar process infringed
on its patent, and was granted a preliminary injunction by the federal district court. The Federal
Circuit reversed the district court finding that Barnes and Noble's prior arguments raised a sub-
stantial issue regarding the validity of the patent. Id.
96. Douglas L. Price, Assessing the Patentability of Financial Services and Products, 3 J. HIGH
TECH. L. 141, 155 (2004).
97. Id. (quoting Neil F. Carlson, Developing Business Process Patents and Intellectual Prop-
erty, 82 STRATEGIC FIN. 65 (2000).
98. Gene patents and software patents were also subject to much criticism. Detractors of
software patents put forth criticisms similar to those leveled at business method patents. Patents
on genetic technology focused primarily on doubts about whether advances in the field were
invented as opposed to discovered. See John R. Allison & Starling D. Hunter, On the Feasibility
of Improving Patent Quality One Technology at a Time: The Case of Business Methods, 21
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Critics of business method patents questioned the quality of such
patents. Prior art with respect to business methods is sparse because
such methods, if they are perceived to confer a competitive advantage
to the user, are generally practiced in secret.99 Much of the prior art
that does exist is not found in scholarly publications but in trade usage
and common knowledge. Moreover, Patent and Trademark Office ex-
aminers do not have the requisite training and background to provide
an adequate analysis of prior art. Improvements to business methods
often occur in small increments that can only charitably be considered
inventive. 1°° The Honorable Richard A. Posner aptly summed up
such criticisms:
One particularly important development ... was the recognition of
a class of patents called "business method patents," which are not
technology, but instead are ideas for better ways of doing business.
In the old days, such ideas would have been thought non-patenta-
ble, would have been considered the kind of normal business inno-
vation that is driven by incentives that did not depend on
propertization. A number of what have in the olden days been
thought of as dubious improvements in business method have been
granted patents and those patents have been upheld.... Instead of
stimulating invention, the lax standard of the patent office may be
creating incentives for strategic uses of intellectual property that
end up making invention more costly, more burdensome, this reduc-
ing the rate and distorting the direction of incentive activity. It is
another example of how increasing propertization ... can actually
impair the economic goals that underlie intellectual property
laws. 101
Detractors of business method patents also asserted that the social
costs imposed by such patents far outweighed the benefits they gener-
ated. Business methods are generally employed in public view and,
therefore, there is little to be gained from the disclosure emanating
from the patent issuance process. Moreover, many critics of business
method patents believe that any free-rider problems associated with
business methods are greatly exaggerated because the success of such
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 729, 732 n.6 (2006); John R. Allison & Emerson H. Tiller, The Business
Method Patent Myth, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 987,1012-15 (2003).
99. See Allison & Tiller, supra note 98, at 1012-16; Allison & Hunter, supra note 98, at 732-34.
100. See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfus, Are Business Method Patents Bad For Business, 16 SANTA
CLARA COMPUTER & HjGH TECH. L.J. 263, 268-71 (2000). One scholar reserved particularly
harsh criticism for the patent at issue in the State Street case by stating that "the alleged inventor
had done nothing more than write a pedestrian computer program for performing routine arith-
metic calculations dictated by legal authority, using programming languages, techniques and
computers invented - if at all -by someone else." Jay Dratler, Jr., Alice in Wonderland Meets the
U.S. Patent System, 38 AKRON L. REV. 299, 303 (2005).
101. Richard A. Posner, Do We Have Too Many Intellectual Property Rights, 9 MARO. INTELL.
PROP. L. REV. 173, 184-85 (2005).
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methods tend to depend on firm specific attributes such as compensa-
tion policies, supervision schemes, customer loyalty, and other such
factors. 0 2 The minimal benefit to be gained from the issuance of such
patents is more than offset by the stifling effect on innovation that
results from the issuance of such patents. To the extent innovation is
reliant on an existing body of applied knowledge, private ownership of
certain applications increases the cost of innovation to others. One
critic has conceptualized knowledge as a pyramid. 10 3 At the top are
the "big ideas," those that are instrumental in generating new applica-
tions or technological opportunities. 10 4 At the bottom are specific ap-
plications. 10 5 Relatively little social costs are associated with the
private ownership of specific applications because others have little
use for such applications. The "big ideas," however, form a founda-
tion for future innovation and privatization of these innovations im-
poses significant social costs. To the critics, business method patents
are at the top of the pyramid.10 6
Others justified their criticisms of business method patents on the
grounds that such patents produced "lock-in" and network effects,10 7
resulted in patent flooding, 0 8 disproportionately burdened small en-
terprises, and damaged the public's perception of the patent system.'0 9
Of course, there remained those who argued that the patent system
should limit its application to inventions of an industrial nature." 0
Congress was not oblivious to the crescendo of criticism and, in re-
sponse to the general perception that business methods were typically
practiced in secret, enacted The First Inventor Defense Act of 1999.111
102. Id. at 275.
103. Id. at 275-76.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 276.
107. "Lock-in" refers to the difficulty of competitors to overcome users' preference of an
application or process. Such difficulty typically stems from the fact that the perceived cost of
switching to a competing application or process outweighs the perceived benefits of such a
switch. Network effects arise if the benefit of an application or process is dependent, in large
part, on the existence of a large network of users of the same process or application. Both "lock-
in" and network effects can arise in short order and create market distortions. For an analysis of
how innovations can become platforms that form the foundation for broad ecosystems. See
DAVID S. EVANS ET AL., INVISIBLE ENGINES: How SOFTWARE PLATFORMS DRIVE INNOVATION
AND TRANSFORM INDUSTRIES (2006).
108. See Michael J. Meurer, Business Method Patents and Patent Floods, 8 WASH. U. J.L &
POL. 309 (2002).
109. See Allison & Tiller, supra note 98, at 1008-12.
110. See Thomas, supra note 16, at 1178-85. See also Alan L. Durham, "Useful Arts" in the
Information Age, 1999 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1419 (1999).
111. Pub. L. No. 106-113, 113 Stat. 1536 (1999) (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 273
(2006)). Congress also acted more broadly on the issue of business method patents. The Business
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This legislation was unusual in two respects. First, it created a prior
user defense against patent infringement actions. A person, acting in
good faith, could defend against a patent infringement action if the
subject matter that would otherwise infringe on one or more patent
claims was actually reduced to practice at least one year before the
effective filing date of the patent and the subject matter was commer-
cially used before such date. 112 Although other nations have provided
defenses to first inventors who exploit their invention in secret,
United States patent law had not, until the enactment of this legisla-
tion, recognized such a defense. 113 Consequently, a prior user exploit-
ing the invention in secret may continue to use the invention despite
the issuance of a patent to another person. 114
Secondly, the statutory defense applies only to business method
patents and was thus a rare case of legislation that singled out a partic-
ular subject matter for special treatment under the patent laws. 1" 5 The
Patent and Trademark Office, cognizant of the criticisms being heaped
upon business method patents, undertook efforts to enhance the qual-
ity of such patents. Among the measures implemented by the Patent
Method Patent Improvement Act of 2000, H.R. 5364, 106th Cong. (2006), would have made the
issuance of such patents more difficult and subsequent challenges to them less difficult by,
among other provisions, creating a presumption of obviousness in certain cases, instituting post-
grant administrative challenges, and reducing the burden of proof for the person challenging
such patents. The bill received no action. The next year a similar bill, The Business Method
Patent Improvement Act of 2001, H.R. 1332, 107th Cong. (2001), was introduced and similarly
received no action.
112. 35 U.S.C. § 273(b)(1) (2006). This defense does not cause the invalidation of a patent. 35
U.S.C. § 273(b)(9) (2006). If the defense proves unsuccessful attorney fees may be awarded by
the court to the patent holder if the person raising the defense had no reasonable basis for doing
so. 35 U.S.C. § 273(b)(8) (2006).
113. Unlike the United States, other nations employ a first to file system for determining
patent priority. Under the first to invent system employed in the United States prior users are
not considered to be as vulnerable to having their invention patented out from under them as
they would be under a first to file system.
114. The statute expressly provides that the commercial use of a method does not depend on
whether the subject matter at issue is accessible to or otherwise known to the public. 35 U.S.C.
§ 273(a)(1) (2006).
115. 35 U.S.C. § 273(a)(3) (2006); 35 U.S.C. § 273(b)(3)(A) (2006). The legislation did not,
however, define the term "method of doing or conducting business." Several years earlier § 616
of the Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, 1997, The Limitation On Patent Infringe-
ments Relating To A Medical Practitioner's Performance Of A Medical Activity, Pub. L. No.
104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996), provided immunity against patent infringement actions to certain
health care providers. This legislation, codified at 35 U.S.C. § 287(c) (2000), precludes a patent
holder form obtaining either damages or injunctive relief against a medical practitioner or health
care facility with respect to the performance of a medical procedure on humans, or relating to
the treatment of humans, that does not involve the use of a patented machine, patented matter,
or biotechnology patent. Generally, this legislation was in response to the patenting of medical
procedures such as surgical techniques and the concomitant concern that such patents could
compromise patient care.
PATENTING OF TAX STRATEGIES
and Trademark Office were the hiring of examiners with expertise in
software and business, the provision of additional training and en-
hanced data bases, and the establishment of a forum in conjunction
with several industries to discuss issues relating to business method
patents.116 A second level of examiner review was also instituted for
business method patent applications. 17 As a result of these measures,
the grant rate for business method patent applications declined from
56 percent to 35-40 percent between March of 2000 and October
2002.118
III. TAX STRATEGY PATENTS
As of December 31, 2006 there were fifty patents issued that were
listed under the classification for tax strategy patents.119 Reliance on
the patent classification system to ferret out claims implicating tax
matters is both over and under-inclusive. Many patents that are clas-
sified in other subclasses of class 705 may contain claims related to tax
matters as did, for example, the patent in question in State Street.120
Moreover, patents classified in subclass 36T, Tax Strategies, contain
claims that involve methods of calculating amounts that are necessary
for some tax purpose, software for efficiently carrying out a transac-
tion or preparing required reports, or, in at least one case, have no
connection to tax matters at all.121
Patent claims involving methods that aid with the compliance of
statutory or regulatory requirements or enable taxpayers to effectively
and efficiently take advantage of tax planning opportunities that are
presented by the tax statutes or regulations raise no special issues. For
example, whether a software program that enables a corporation to
determine its foreign tax credit position is entitled to patent protec-
tion should be determined under the standards applicable to a busi-
ness method claim in general. The inventions that raise special issues
116. See Allison & Tiller, supra note 98, at 1024-26.
117. Id. at 1026.
118. Id.
119. Tax Strategy patents are classified in subclass 36T "Tax Strategies," part of class 705
"Data Processing: Financial. Business Practices, Management, or Cost/Price Determination. Pat-
ent classification schedules for class 705 are available at http://www.uspto.gov/go/classification/
uspc705/sched705.htm (last visited Apr. 9, 2007). A listing of patents issued that are classified in
subclass 36T is available at http://www.uspto.gov (last visited Apr. 10, 2006).
120. The process at issue in State Street contained claims related to the maintenance of book
capital accounts and the reporting of required tax information to partners. See supra notes 81-83
and accompanying text.
121. See Multi-layer corrosion resistant coating, U.S. Patent No. 6,342,272 (issued Jan. 29,
2002).
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are those whose claims are broad enough to encompass the underlying
tax planning technique itself.
One patent applicant's claim, for example, covers the conversion of
traditional individual retirement accounts to Roth individual retire-
ment accounts and the minimization of the tax consequences of such
conversion through the use of annuities. 122 An issued patent's claims
include the funding of grantor retained annuity trusts with compensa-
tory stock options to minimize transfer tax liabilities. 123 If a person
invents a useful, novel, and nonobvious method of determining the
optimum time, and amount, to covert a traditional individual retire-
ment account or to fund a grantor retained annuity trust then patent
protection should issue. It is quite another matter, however, to grant
the inventor rights to such an extent that such rights cover individual
retirement account conversions using annuities or trust funding with
compensatory stock options per se. The granting of such rights is tan-
tamount to the grant of a proprietary interest in the law. These are
the patents about which this article is concerned.
A. Application of Criticisms of Business Method Patents to
Tax Strategy Patents
Patents on tax strategies are susceptible to the same criticisms lev-
eled at business method patents generally. However, many of the
problems associated with business method patents in general are ei-
ther ephemeral or have little application to tax strategy patents.
Much of the criticism leveled at the quality of business method patents
is premised on the lack of prior art references. To that extent, criti-
122. Method of doing business involving conversion of traditional individual retirement ac-
count to a Roth individual retirement account, U.S. Patent No. App. No. 10/123,703, Pub. No.
US 2003/0195827 Al, Oct. 16, 2003 (filed April 15, 2002) available at http://aiwl.uspto.gov/.aiw?
Docid=20030195827&idkey=NONE (last visited Apr. 10, 2007) (describing both conversions).
Contributions to traditional individual retirement accounts are deductible but withdrawals from
such accounts are taxable. In contrast, contributions to Roth individual retirement accounts are
not deductible but withdrawals are tax free. Both types of accounts are subject to various income
restrictions and other requirements. See James Lange, IRAs After the TRA '97 - What Hath
Congress Roth?, 5-98 TAX ADVISER 318 (1998). The Tax Increase Prevention and Reconciliation
Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-222, 120 Stat. 345 (2006) and the Pension Protection Act of 2006,
Pub. L. No, 109-280, 120 Stat. 780 (2006) liberalized the rules governing Roth individual retire-
ment accounts. See generally Catina M. Scafidi & Anthony P. Curatola, Tax Increase Prevention
and Reconciliation Act of 2005, 88 STRATEGIC FIN. 16 (2006); Richard E. Coppage et. al., Prepare
to Benefit from Liberalized Roth IRA Conversion Rules, 77 PRACTICAL TAX STRATEGIES 142
(2006); Stanley D. Baum, Sweeping changes for Pension Plan Funding and Other Rules, Part 2 -
Protections and Incentives, 105 J. TAX'N 277 (2006).
123. Establishing and managing grantor retained annuity trusts funded by nonqualified stock
options, U.S. Patent No. 6,567,790 (issued May. 20, 2003). This patent is the subject of pending
litigation. See infra note 203 and accompanying text.
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cism of tax strategy patents should be muted because there exists an
extensive and rich body of tax literature. In addition, the patent issu-
ance process will itself create a body of prior art. If, for sake of argu-
ment, one concedes the fact that patent office personnel lack the
adequate background and training in tax matters to properly review
applications for such patents then, at worst, a temporary problem ex-
ists. If the subject matter in question deserves statutory protection
then it should be protected. It is of no moment that the personnel are
ill-equipped to deal with such matter. The solution is not to banish
the subject matter to the commons, but to properly equip the person-
nel to handle such applications effectively and efficiently. To its
credit, the Patent and Trademark Office has taken steps to improve
the quality of business method patents. 124 Nothing would suggest that
it is incapable of doing the same in the tax area. Moreover, tax strat-
egy patents invariably involve the combination of well known tax
techniques that, when used in isolation, are patently obvious. The Su-
preme Court, rejecting the Federal Circuit's application of the "teach-
ing-suggestion-motivation" test, has raised the standards for
nonobviousness for such inventions. 25
Moreover, the perceived lack of quality inherent in business
method patents in general may be rooted more in anecdote than in
fact. Allison and Tiller's statistical comparison of internet business
method patents with patents in general showed that the former had
significantly more patent references, non-patent references, and total
references than patents in general. This finding, along with others, led
the authors to conclude that they found no evidence to support the
notion that Internet business method patents were of inferior quality
or of lower value than other patents.126 The gap between perception
and reality was created by a few highly publicized patents, such as
Amazon's patent on the one-click shopping system, and then rein-
forced by what behavioral scientists refer to as "confirmation bias" or
"behavioral perseverance."'1 27
It is also unlikely that the issuance of patents on tax strategies will
produce any "lock-in" or network effects. Such effects are characteris-
124. See supra notes 116-118 and accompanying text.
125. See supra notes 50-57 and accompanying text.
126. Allison & Tiller, supra note 98, at 1081. In addition to prior art references, the authors
also tested four other value indicators: the type of prior art references; the number of claims
within the patents; the number of inventors; and the time spent in the Patent and Trademark
Office before issuance. Id. at 998.
127. Id. at 1081(citing several works in the behavioral sciences). These terms are used to de-
scribe the tendency of persons to give greater credence to, and oftentimes to actively seek out,
information that confirms beliefs that such persons already hold.
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tic of products whose value or utility increases as the number of users
of such products increases. 128 It is equally unlikely that the Patent and
Trademark Office will be flooded with applications based on such
strategies to an extent that, when compared to business strategy pat-
ents in general, merits mention. Moreover, tax strategy patents will
likely have their greatest impact on large, complex businesses and
most small businesses should remain oblivious to the existence of such
patents. Objections based on the notion that patents should be issued
exclusively for industrial inventions have no greater force in the tax
strategy area than they have in the broader context of business
method patents. In any event, that train has left the station and, given
the economy's increasing reliance on technology, is very unlikely to
return.
The issuance of tax strategy patents could, however, further erode
the public's perception of the patent system, especially in light of the
likely enforcement difficulties associated with such patents.129 How-
ever, the criticism that resonates with particular force in the tax strat-
egy area is the assertion that the costs of such patents outweigh their
benefits. The patenting of tax strategies will add new complexity to an
area of law in no particular need of it and exacerbate the commonly
held notions that the tax law suffers from a lack of transparency and is
applied in an unfair manner.
Specifically, on the cost side, granting patents for such inventions
will inject patent law issues into an area of law that is already note-
worthy for its byzantine complexity. Granting such patents will also
encourage the development of abusive and aggressive tax strategies.
Moreover, the patentability of tax strategies will provide new fodder
for the all too prevalent rent-seeking and rent extraction activities that
are so commonplace with respect to tax legislation. Finally, enforce-
ment of such patents will prove difficult and be uneven at best further
buttressing the perception that the tax system is not fairly adminis-
tered. In light of the costs attendant to the granting of tax strategy
patents, justification for such patents must lie with the benefits, in the
form of incentives to innovate, that such patents provide. The bene-
fits to be gained by the issuance of such patents, however, are dubious.
Tax lawyers have rarely been accused of a lack of ingenuity and incen-
tives for tax lawyers to produce are plentiful.
A final objection to the issuance of patents on tax strategies is based
on the nature of the subject matter of the patents - the law. This
128. See generally Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Network Externalities, Competition, and
Compatibility, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 424 ( 1985 ).
129. See infra notes 184-205 and accompanying text.
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objection is not rooted in utilitarian grounds. Patents on tax strategies
amount to grants by the government of proprietary interests in the law
to private citizens. Such patents commodify the law and ignore the
law as a singular achievement that, more so than any other human
accomplishment, properly belongs to the commons.
B. The Cost of Tax Strategy Patents: Complexity and its Corrosive
Effect on Voluntary Compliance
The income tax law of the United States is complex, fluid, and the
most significant source of federal revenue.130 At its inception in 1913,
the income tax laws of the United States were contained in 14 pages
and an individual had to grapple with a tax return three pages in
length after taking the time to read one page of instructions.13 1 Two
decades later the tax statutes had expanded to 100 pages.' 3 2 Today,
the Internal Revenue Code contains almost 3000 pages and the Inter-
nal Revenue Service publishes approximately 400 forms and sched-
ules.133 Cne commentator, in recounting the days when an associate
would be told to read the tax statutes in their entirety and report back,
quipped that such a request today would result in the associate's per-
manent absence. 134
Tax law concerns itself with issues that "revolve[ ] around timing
and character."'1 35 By their nature such laws define a tax base and,
accordingly, measurement, classification, and summarization issues
are ubiquitous. 136 Much of the tax law's complexity is derived from
130. In fiscal year 2005 approximately 2.27 trillion dollars in total tax were collected of which
over sixty percent was generated by individual and corporate income taxes. See I.R.S., 2005
DATA BOOK 1, tbl.1, col.3, available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/05databk.pdf (last visited
Apr. 10, 2007).
131. See Frank J. Doti, Federal Tax Policy in the New Millennium, 2 CHAP. L. REV. 27, 28
(1999). The ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution ushered
in the modern federal income tax system. The Revenue Act of 1913, Pub. L. No. 63-16, 38 Stat.
167 (1913), was enacted shortly thereafter and was followed by all too regular legislative actions.
Three major codifications, the Internal Revenue Codes of 1939, 1954, and 1986, have occurred
since 1913.
132. See Charles I. Kingson, How Tax Thinks, 37 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1031, 1033 (2004).
133. Id. at 28 (citing U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, TAX ADMINISTRATION: THE POTENTIAL
IMPACT OF ALTERNATIVE TAXES ON TAXPAYERS AND ADMINISTRATORS 39-40 (1998)).
134. See Kingson, supra note 132, at 1034.
135. Deborah Lohse, Tax Report, WALL ST. J., July 20, 1994, at Al (indicating that Ed
Klienbard discussed the rules applicable to hedging transactions).
136. These issues and their attendant complexities lie at the heart of the muddled debate
concerning whether certain tax services rendered by certified public accountants constitute un-
authorized practice of law. See, e.g., In re N.Y. County Law. Ass'n., 78 N.Y.S. 2d 209 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1948) (applying an incidental service test in determining whether tax services performed by
an accountant amounted to the unauthorized practice of law); Gardner v. Conway, 48 N.W. 2d
788 (Minn. 1951) (holding that whether tax services constituted the unauthorized practice of law
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the growth of the domestic and international economies and the in-
herent complexity of industrial and post-industrial business practices.
Less benign reasons for the law's complexity are the influence of spe-
cial interests 137 and the tendency of legislators to use the tax laws as a
means of social engineering.1 3
Support for tax simplification has achieved a level of consensus
rarely seen in academic, business, and political circles. One commen-
tator stated that "[o]ne rarely hears a person declare 'I'm all for com-
plexity. I love the fact that the Internal Revenue Code is mind-
numbingly complex!"' 139 Proposals for simplification of the tax sys-
tem have been put forth for quite some time and some efforts have
borne fruit, albeit fruit with a short shelf-life. 140
by the service provider depended, in part, on whether difficult or elementary questions of law
were at issue). Line drawing between the accounting and legal professions has defied consensus
because measurement, classification, and summarization issues cannot be divorced from the law
itself and, in many cases, the resolution of such issues are statutorily prescribed.
137. See generally Edward J. McCaffrey & Linda R. Cohen, Shakedown at Gucci Gulph: The
New Logic of Collective Action, 84 N.C.L. REV. 1159 (2006).
138. Among the more recognizable examples of use of the tax code to encourage particular
activities are the incentives that exist for residential housing, employer provided health insur-
ance, and education. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 163(h)(2)(D) (2006); I.R.C. § 163(h)(3) (2006) (excepting
interest on most acquisition indebtedness with respect to primary residences and second homes
and interest on certain home equity debt from the general prohibition on the deductibility of
personal interest); § 164(a)(1) (2006) (allowing deductions for state, local, and foreign real prop-
erty taxes); § 121 (2006) (excluding certain amounts from income recognized on the sale of a
principal residence); I.R.C. § 106 (2006) (excluding employer provided health care insurance
from income); I.R.C. § 25A (2006) (providing tax credits for certain educational expenses);
I.R.C. § 117 (2006) (excluding from gross income certain scholarships and tuition reduction pay-
ments from income). Apart from their contribution to the complexity of the tax system, tax
incentives are subject to criticism because they tend to distort incentives and encourage over-
investment in the area that is favored. See William T, Mathias, Curtailing the Economic Distor-
tion of the Mortgage Interest Deduction, 30 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 43 (1996). Moreover, such
incentives are often used to camouflage the cost of such incentives to the body politic because
revenue losses through tax provisions lack the transparency of spending appropriations. See gen-
erally Stanley S. Surrey & Paul R. McDaniel, The Tax Expenditure Concept and the Budget
Reform Act of 1974, 17 B.C. INDUS. & COMM. L. REV. 679, 697 (1976).
139. Steve R. Johnson, Administratively-Based Tax Simplification, 4 NEV. L.J. 573, 579 (2004).
Tax simplification would not be welcome in all quarters, however. Those persons who make a
living - usually a quite good one - navigating the complexities of the Internal Revenue Code
would most likely oppose simplification. Members of Congress, who hold out the tax law like a
proverbial cookie jar, and the lobbyists who enjoy putting their hands in the cookie jar may be
reluctant to lose the camouflage complexity offers. See infra notes 176-83 and accompanying text
for a discussion of the relationship between lobbyists and lawmakers.
140. See, e.g., Edward J. McCaffrey, A New Understanding of Tax, 103 MICH. L. REV. 807
(2005); Michael J. Graetz, 100 Million Unnecessary Returns: A Fresh Start for the U.S. Tax Sys-
tem, 112 YALE L.J. 261 (2002); Alan Schenk, Federal Tax Policy in the New Millennium: Radical
Tax Reform for the 21s' Century: The Role for a Consumption Tax, 2 CHAP. L. REV. 133, 138-146
(1999). See also Ernest Tollerson, Bowing Out: Forbes Quits and Offers His Support to Dole,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 1996, at A26 (summarizing presidential candidate Steve Forbes' platform
for tax reform). The Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (1986), arguably
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Inordinate complexity creates burdens at several levels. At the tax-
payer level, complexity increases compliance costs. Estimates of ag-
gregate compliance costs vary widely but there is little doubt the costs
are significant. 141 These costs, moreover, represent a deadweight cost
to the economy.1 42 More pernicious is the effect complexity has on
compliance. The U.S. income tax system is self-assessing. Voluntary
taxpayer compliance, underpinned by the Internal Revenue Code's
"reliance on taxpayers to come clean about their taxable income,"'143
is the sine qua non of the system. Complexity erodes taxpayer support
for the system by encouraging the belief that the system is unfair, sub-
ject to manipulation, and, in many cases, unenforceable. 144 Recent
the signal domestic policy achievement of the Reagan Administration, made significant strides in
reforming the income tax system. In some cases the legislation simplified the tax structure. For
example, tax rates were compressed and capital gain preferences were eliminated. In other cases,
reform meant greater complexity as witnessed by the introduction of the passive activity loss
rules and the reformulation and expansion of the alternative minimum tax. Moreover, much of
what was accomplished by the 1986 legislation was undone by subsequent legislation such as the
Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, 104 Stat. 1388 (1990), and the Reve-
nue Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66. 107 Stat. 312 (1993). For an informative
analysis of the recent history of tax legislation and its effect on reform efforts see Robert J.
Peroni, Tax Reform Interrupted: The Chaotic State of Tax Policy in 2003, 35 McGEORGE L. REV.
277 (2004). One particularly vitriolic response to the current state of the tax system was the
passage by the House of Representatives of the Tax Code Termination Act of 1998, H.R. 3097,
105th Cong. (1998).
141. Estimates of income tax compliance costs have reached as high as $ 360 billion dollars
per annum. See Johnson, supra note 139, at 580 n.36. More realistically, compliance costs are
probably within shouting range of $100 billion. See id. at 581 (citing the work of economists Joel
Slemrod and Jon Bajika).
142. Compliance costs have been at the heart of the recent debate over the issue of whether
the internal control attestation requirement imposed by § 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002), should be reconsidered. See, e.g., William J.
Carney, The Cost of Being Public After Sarbanes-Oxley: The Irony of Going Private, 55 EMORY
L.J. 141 (2006); Paul Rose, Balancing Public Market Benefits and Burdens for Small Companies
Post Sarbanes-Oxley, 41 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 707 (2005); David Reilly, Regulator Says Account-
ing Rules May Ease but Will Stay in Place, WALL ST. J., Nov. 18, 2006, at B5; Annette Nazareth,
Keeping SarbOx is Crucial, BUSINESSWEEK, Nov. 13, 2006, at 124. A recent study by the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission appears to indicate that costs incurred in assessing and improv-
ing internal controls may be a good use of corporate funds. See David Reilly, Restatement Blame:
Basic Mistakes, WALL ST. J., Nov. 20, 2006, at C4 (reporting that a study by the Office of the
Chief Accountant of the Securities and Exchange Commission found that approximately 55 per-
cent of recent accounting restatements were due to the misapplication of basic accounting rules
and use of incorrect data - mistakes that implicate internal control failures).
143. Linda M. Beale, Book-Tax Conformity and the Corporate Tax Shelter Debate: Assessing
the Proposed Section 475 Mark-to-Market Safe Harbor, 24 VA. TAX REV. 301, 371 (2004).
144. See generally Kenneth A. Gary & Sheryl Stratton, Top Regulators Weigh in on Shelters,
102 TAX NOTES 947 (2003) (quoting I.R.S. Commissioner Mark Everson on the complicity of
complexity in the increase of abusive tax shelters): Thomas F. Field, The Emperor Has No
Clothes, 102 TAX NOTES 1125 (2003). In a study of the 1997 Arkansas tax penalty amnesty pro-
gram non-filers that owed high amounts of tax reported that the unfairness of the tax system
influenced their failure to file. CHRISTINA M. RITSEMA ET. AL., ECONOMIC AND BEHAVIORAL
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estimates that annual revenue losses resulting from noncompliance,
both intentional and unintentional, exceed $300 billion is damning evi-
dence that too many persons cannot, or will not, comply with the
law. 145 Recent Internal Revenue Service data indicates that publicly
traded companies reduced their U.S. taxable income by at least $ 34.8
billion dollars in 2004 through the use of potentially abusive
transactions. 146
The revenue loss is all the more startling when one considers that
much of tax compliance is effectuated through what one scholar calls
structural, as opposed to fiat, rules that render non-compliance diffi-
cult. 47 Whether a person chooses to comply with the tax law is predi-
cated, to some extent, on the costs of non-compliance and such costs
must account for the likelihood and severity of enforcement ac-
tions.148 However, social norms also play a significant role in any vol-
untary compliance system. Cheating creates its own non-virtuous
circle, or what one scholar calls the " Logic of Reciprocity."'1 49 The
more people cheat the more people will cheat. Empirical research has
DETERMINANTS OF TAX COMPLIANCE: EVIDENCE FROM THE 1997 ARKANSAS TAX PENALTY
AMNESTY PROGRAM 13 (2003), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/ritsema.pdf (last vis-
ited Apr. 10, 2007).
145. See Allen Kenney, IRS Oversight Board Calls for Tighter Enforcement, More Funds, 2004
T.N.T. 150-1 (2004).
146. Jesse Drucker, Minding the Gap: IRS Looks Closer at Profit Disparity, WALL ST. J., Nov.
27, 2006, at C1. United States public companies reported approximately $554 billion in pre-tax
profits for financial accounting purposes, approximately $160 billion more than reported for tax-
able income purposes. Most of the disparity is a result of differences in accounting methods
between financial accounting and tax accounting methods. Id.
147. Regulation by fiat is a direct method of regulating behavior. Such regulation is character-
ized by specific prohibitions on conduct that are enforced ex post by government sanctions or
private tort litigation. Most of criminal law and traffic regulations are enforced by fiat. Ineffec-
tive fiat regimes tend to reduce compliance by contributing to the sense that the rules in question
are discriminatorily applied. Moreover, the inability to adequately enforce such laws reduces the
social stigma of noncompliance. In contrast, structural rules operate indirectly by influencing
behavior ex ante. Structural rules include the use of surveillance cameras and metal detectors.
The perceived ineffectiveness of fiat regulations has spurred efforts by Mothers Against Drunk
Driving to require the installation of alcohol detectors in automobiles. See Matthew L. Wald, A
New Strategy To Discourage Driving Drunk, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2006, at Al. Income tax with-
holding requirements are an example of very effective structural rules that make noncompliance
difficult. See generally Edward K. Cheng, Structural law and the Puzzle of Regulating Behavior,
100 N.W. U. L. REV. 655 (2006).
148. See generally Yoram Keinan, Playing the Audit Lottery: The Role of Penalties in the U.S.
Tax Law in the Aftermath of Long Term Capital Holdings v. United States, 3 BERKELEY BUS. L.J.
381, 394-97 (2006) (discussing the economics of penalties); Eric A. Posner, Law and Social
Norms: The Case of Tax Compliance, 86 VA. L. REV. 1781, 1783 (2000) (asserting that if the
expected sanction exceeds the tax payment then a person will pay the tax).
149. See Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Doing the Full Monty: Will Publishing Tax Information In-
crease Compliance?, 18 CAN. J.L. & JURIS. 95, 96-97 (2005) (citing the work of Professor Dan
Kahan).
PATENTING OF TAX STRATEGIES
found that most taxpayers perceive tax evasion as equivalent to mini-
mum wage violations and less serious than other white collar crimes
and that M.B.A. students appreciate the seriousness of tax evasion
more readily than many tax professors and graduate tax students.150
1. Increased Complexity Resulting From Patent Issuance
The issuance of tax strategy patents inexorably leads to further
complications in tax planning and compliance and provides fodder for
the argument that the tax system is gamed. Tax practitioners, in addi-
tion to navigating existing tax authority, may have a due diligence ob-
ligation to conduct a patent search. 51 If a patent is discovered during
the course of the search then the practitioner must grapple with a vari-
ety of issues. Does the patent cover the tax strategy that is being con-
templated by the taxpayer and, if so, what actions constitute
infringement? Infringement could be deemed to occur at the time the
tax advisor renders the advice, at the time the strategy is executed, or
at the time the tax return is filed. 152 If a particular strategy yields
multiyear benefits infringement may continue to occur as long as tax
benefits are derived from the strategy. Due diligence not only may be
advisable in the discharge of an advisor's professional duties but may
also be necessary to avoid potential infringement liability as an in-
fringement "inducer." 153
Additional complications arise from several questions that tax prac-
titioners will be forced to answer. Should the taxpayer challenge the
150. See Linda M. Beale, Tax Advice Before the Return: The Case for Raising Standards and
Denying Evidentiary Privileges, 25 VA. TAX REV. 583, 600-01 (2006).
151. Tax Strategy patents are classified in subclass 36T "Tax Strategies," part of class 705
Data Processing: Financial. Business Practices, Management, or Cost/Price Determination. Pat-
ent classification schedules for class 705 are available at http://www.uspto.gov/go/classification/
uspc705/sched705.htm (last visited Apr. 10, 2007) It is conceivable that malpractice insurance
carriers mandate a patent search. See generally James M. Fischer, External Control Over the
American Bar, 19 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 59 (2006) (discussing how insurers, among others, have
influenced the practice of law in the United States). Note that a patent applicant has a duty of
candor and therefore, has an obligation to disclose prior art that is known to the applicant.
However, the applicant has no affirmative duty to search for such prior art and is often discour-
aged from doing so. See FMC Corp. v. Hennessy Indus., Inc., 836 F.2d 521, 526 n.6 (Fed. Cir.
1987). See also John R. Thomas, Collusion and Collective Action in the Patent System: A Proposal
for Patent Bounties, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 305, 315 (2001).
152. Patent infringement arising from the rendering of tax advice implicates issues attendant
to the attorney-client relationship. See infra notes 235-37 and accompanying text.
153. In addition to the infringer, persons who induce others to infringe on a patent are also
liable for infringement. 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) (2006). In order to be held liable under this provision
the inducer must have knowledge of the patent at issue and commit a positive act that materially
furthers the infringement. See generally Black & Decker, Inc. v. Catalina Lighting, Inc., 953 Fed.
Supp. 134, 138 (E.D. Va. 1997).
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validity of the patent and, if so, how? 154 Should the taxpayer obtain a
license to employ the strategy? Resolution of these issues requires
time, money, and perhaps more problematically, may produce differ-
ent outcomes for similarly situated taxpayers. Patent litigation is very
expensive. 155 Some taxpayers will choose to litigate and others,
whether due to lack of resources or as a result of a calculated cost-
benefit analysis, will forego litigation and negotiate a license. License
negotiations result in significant transaction costs and may result in
widely disparate outcomes for taxpayers depending on their tax
posture. 156
2. Encouragement of Abusive and Aggressive Tax Positions
The issuance of tax strategy patents may contribute to increased
non-compliance by further eroding the 'Logic of Reciprocity" that un-
154. Administrative challenges to patent validity are available through ex parte reexamination
and inter partes reexamination. For various reasons, including estoppel issues, these methods
have not proved to be a very effective method of post-grant dispute resolution. See 35 U.S.C.
§§ 301-307 (2000); Andrew Kopelman, Note: Addressing Questionable Business Method Patents
Prior to Issuance: A Two-Part Proposal, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2391, 2407-09 (2006). Generally,
actions for infringement will elicit an answer from the defendant that denies infringement or
challenges the validity of the patent. In some cases, an accused infringer may assert an affirma-
tive defense pursuant to the First Inventor Defense Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-113, 113 Stat.
1536 (1999). See supra notes 116-118 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court has recently
held that that the holder of a patent license may sue to challenge the validity of a patent despite
the fact that the license holder continued to pat royalties. The Court reversed a Federal Circuit
decision that had held that the payment of royalties precluded the licensee from challenging the
validity of a patent because, as long as royalties were being paid, no controversy existed for the
court to adjudicate. The Court's decision will allow licensee's to challenge a patent's validity
without having to risk a patent infringement claim due to the failure to pay royalties. See
MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., No. 05-608, 2007 U.S. LEXIS 1003 (Jan. 9, 2007).
155. Attorney fees, court costs, expert witness fees, and other costs can easily exceed seven
figures. A 1999 study conducted by the Intellectual Property Law Association calculated the
median cost of patent litigation at over $2,000,000 in suits where the dollar amounts at risk were
between $10,000,000 and $100,000,000 and the cost through discovery approximating $1,500,000.
See Jay P. Kesan & Andres A. Gallo, Why "Bad" Patents Survive in the Market and How Should
We Change?-The Private and Social Costs of Patents, 55 EMORY L.J. 61, 69 n.35 (2006). The
American Intellectual Property Law Association recently reported that the typical patent in-
fringement case costs each party $650,000 when the amount at risk is less than $1 million. The
cost increases to $2 million per party when the amount at risk is between $1 million and $25
million. Testimony of Professor Ellen P. Aprill of the Loyola Law School (Los Angeles) Before
the Subcommittee on Select Revenue Measures of the Committee on Ways & Means, July 13, 2006
(statement of Ellen P. Aprill, Professor of Law, Loyola Law School, citing the AM. INTELL.
PROP. LAW Ass'N., REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY 22 (2005). A recent survey of corporate
law departments found that intellectual property and patent litigation is high on the list of litiga-
tion concerns. See Stephen C. Dillard, Litigation Nation, WALL ST. J. Nov. 25-26, 2006, at A9
(discussing the results of the most recent Litigation Trends Survey).
156. For example, the outcome of licensing negotiations and the bargaining power of the par-
ties will be impacted by the profile of the patent holder, the time-sensitivity of the tax strategy in
question, and the dollar amount of potential tax savings.
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derpins a self-assessed tax system.1 57 The ability to patent tax strate-
gies may exacerbate the corrosive influence that abusive tax shelters
have had on the polity's respect for the tax system. Under current law
taxpayers must provide information to the Internal Revenue Service
with respect to reportable transactions. 58 Reportable transactions in-
clude "listed transactions,"' t 59 transactions with contractual protec-
tion,160 transactions that result in losses exceeding pre-defined
thresholds, 61 transactions that result in significant disparities between
tax and financial statement reporting, 62 and transactions that gener-
ate a tax credit from an asset held for a brief period of time. 63 Addi-
tional reportable transactions are transactions that are offered to
taxpayers under conditions of confidentiality and for which a mini-
157. See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
158. Form 8886, "Reportable Transaction Disclosure Statement," is used to make the required
disclosures. This form is to be filed with the taxpayers income tax return for each taxable year
for a taxpayer participates in a reportable transaction. Treas. Reg. § 1.6011-4(d)-(e)(1) (2003).
Failure to file such disclosures or failure to include required reportable transaction information
with the disclosure is subject to penalty. See I.R.C. § 6707A (2006). Moreover, reporting obliga-
tions are also imposed on material tax advisors with respect to such transactions as well as a
requirement to maintain a list of advisees. See generally I.R.C. §§ 6111- 6112 (2006). The Ameri-
can Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, 118 Stat. 1418 (2004) made significant
changes to these provisions. Proposed regulations were recently issued that would implement the
statutory changes. See Prop. Treas. Reg. §§ 301.6111-3 (proposed Nov. 2, 2006) (to be codified at
71 Fed. Reg. 64496); Treas. Reg. §§ 301.6112-1 (proposed Nov. 2, 2006) (to be codified at 71 Fed.
Reg. 64501). Taxpayers who fail to disclose reportable transactions that result in a substantial
understatement of tax are also subject to a 30 percent penalty without the benefit of a reasona-
ble cause exception. See I.R.C. § 6662A(c) (2006); I.R.C. § 6664 (2006). Substantial understate-
ment penalty resulting from disclosed transactions are subject to a 20 percent penalty that may
be avoided if certain requirements are met. See I.R.C. § 6664(d)(2)(B)-(C) (2006).
159. A listed transaction is a transaction that is the same or substantially similar to a transac-
tion that the Internal Revenue Service has determined to be a tax avoidance transaction and has
identified such transaction in published guidance. Treas. Reg. § 1.6011-4(b)(2) (2003). The pen-
alty for failure to comply with the reportable transaction disclosure rules is increased if the trans-
action in question is a listed transaction. See I.R.C. § 6707A(b)(2) (2006).
160. A transaction with contractual protection is one for which the taxpayer or a related party
has the right to a full or partial refund if the intended tax consequences from the transaction are
not sustained or for which the fees are contingent on the taxpayer's realization of tax benefits.
Treas. Reg. § 1.6011-4(b)(4) (2003).
161. See generally Treas. Reg. § 1.6011-4(b)(5) (2003).
162. This provision applies only to publicly traded companies and related entities and entities
whose gross assets, for financial reporting purposes, exceed $ 250 million. See Treas. Reg.
§ 1.6011-4(b)(6)(ii)(A) (2003). Regulations were recently proposed that would eliminate these
transactions from the definition of reportable transactions. See AJCA Modifications to the Sec-
tion 6011 Regulations, Explanation of Provisions, 71 Fed. Reg. 64488 (Nov. 2, 2006). The pro-
posed regulations add another category of transactions to the list of reportable transactions -
transactions of interest. See Treas. Reg. § 1.6011-4(b)(6) (proposed Nov. 2, 2006) (to be codified
at 71 Fed. Reg. 64488).
163. Treas. Reg. § 1.6011-4(b)(7) (2003).
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mum fee has been paid to an advisor. 164 A condition of confidential-
ity exists if the advisor places a limitation on disclosure of the tax
treatment or tax structure of the transaction to protect the confidenti-
ality of the advisor's strategy.165 The inclusion of confidential transac-
tions in the category of reportable transactions was a response to
certain high profile transactions that proved abusive. 166 For transac-
tions generating the minimum required fees, and otherwise not re-
portable, tax advisors desiring to maintain the confidentiality of their
intellectual handiwork face the prospect of reporting the transaction
and its details to the Internal Revenue Service. With patent protec-
tion the need for confidentiality would dissipate and the transaction
would be immune to the reporting rules.167
The ability to patent a tax strategy may result in greater efforts to
create tax avoidance transactions. The potential of market control
that a patent confers may provide greater incentives for sharp minds
to use their creativity to pursue tax structures that they otherwise
would find objectionable or not worth their time pursuing. Moreover,
the patent holder may market a tax strategy or structure more aggres-
sively to other professionals if the patent provides the holder with a
greater level of security that their creation will not be appropriated
without compensation. It is also possible that the existence of a patent
for the strategy will be explicitly or tacitly used in marketing the strat-
egy. Although the grant of a patent and its attendant presumption of
validity do not, for tax purposes, legitimize the strategy for which the
patent was granted, it should not come as a surprise if such claims are
164. Treas. Reg. § 1.6011-4(b)(3)(i) (2003). For purposes of this provision the minimum fee is
$ 250,000 for corporate taxpayers and partnerships and trusts all of the owners or beneficiaries of
which are corporations. The minimum fee for all other taxpayers is $ 50,000. Treas. Reg.
§ 1.6011-4(b)(3)(iii)(A)-(B) (2003).
165. Treas. Reg. § 1.6011-4(b)(3)(ii) (2003).
166. Perhaps the most prominent example was the tax strategy designed by Ernst & Young for
the chief executive officer and the president of Sprint Communications. The strategy, known as
the Equity Compensation Strategy, was designed to postpone income taxes on approximately $
200 million of compensatory stock option income for thirty years and attempt to convert a por-
tion of that income into capital gains. See David Cay Johnston, Tax Shelter is Worrying Sprint's
Chief, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 2003, at Cl; Jonathan D. Glater, Auditor Role in Working for Execu-
tives is Questioned, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2003, at Cl; Rebecca Blumenstein & Carol Hymowitz,
Inside the Tough Call at Spri,.t: Fire Auditor or Top Executives, WALL ST. J., Feb. 10, 2003, at Al.
The fact that the tax strategy was designed for two high ranking officers of an audit client of the
accounting firm raised concerns about auditor independence and contributed to the prohibition,
enacted by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, of the provision of certain tax services by indepen-
dent auditors. See infra note 213 and accompanying text.
167. It is possible that, if the Internal Revenue Service perceives that the use of patented tax
strategies is compromising its reporting system, the regulations may be amended to require re-
porting of such transactions.
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made or potential licensees are not disabused of such a notion.168 At
a minimum, a firm's patent holdings will signal to the market an ex-
pertise that may not be justified. Patents provide a means of publiciz-
ing information. Under certain circumstances this function of patents
may be more valuable than the substantive rights that flow from the
patent. Patent holders may obtain a portfolio of patents to signal in-
formation about themselves that would be more expensive to do
through other means or use patent documentation as marketing mate-
rial that carries an aura of credibility. 169
Two arguments may be made that the granting of patents on tax
strategies will result in less output of abusive or aggressive tax strate-
gies. First, the patenting of tax strategies, and its attendant publicity,
will shine light upon potentially abusive tax strategies and provide the
Internal Revenue Service with information that it may use to combat
such strategies.' 70 Moreover, the tax shelter registration and list main-
tenance rules may very well apply to a licensor of patented tax strate-
gies. Although the tax shelter registration rules were not drafted with
patented tax strategies in mind the regulatory language is broad
enough to potentially encompass licensors of such strategies. Tax
shelter organizers are required to register tax shelters with the Inter-
nal Revenue Service. The regulations define tax shelter organizers to
include any person who discovers, creates, investigates, or initiates the
investment. 7 1 Moreover, the list maintenance rules apply to any per-
son that is required to register a transaction. 172
Louis Brandeis once said that '[p]ublicity is justly commended as a
remedy for social and industrial diseases. Sunlight is said to be the
best of disinfectants .... ,,173 Perhaps it is but only if the item that the
disinfectant is meant for is not resistant to it. Congress and the Inter-
168. An issued patent carries a presumption of validity. 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2000). The presump-
tion of validity may be overcome by clear and convincing evidence of invalidity. See Nystrom v.
Trex Co., 424 F.3d 1136, 1149 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
169. See generally Clarisa Long, Patent Signals, 69 U. CHI. L. REv. 625 (2002).
170. In general, patent applications must be published after the expiration of a period of 18
months from the earliest filing date for which a benefit is sought under Title 35. 35 U.S.C.
§ 122(b)(1)(A) (2000). However, an applicant may opt out of this requirement by certifying that
the invention disclosed in the application has not, and will not, be the subject of an application in
another country or under a multilateral agreement that requires publication 18 months after
filing. 35 U.S.C. § 122(b)(2)(B)(i) (2000). It is likely that applicants for tax strategy patents will
avoid the publication requirement.
171. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 301.6111-iT, A-26 - A27 (1986).
172. Treas. Reg. § 301.6112-1(c)(2)(i) (2003). The list maintenance rules also apply to persons
who receive, or expect to receive, minimum fees form the transaction make certain statements
concerning the transaction. See id.; Treas. Reg. § 301.6112-1(c)(2)(ii)-(iii) (2003).
173. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 67 (1976) (quoting Louis D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLES
MONEY AND How BAvdKERS USE IT 62 (Nat'l. Home Lib. Found. ed. 1933)).
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nal Revenue Service have for years ratcheted up the penalties for, and
imposed ever increasing disclosure requirements on, what are per-
ceived to be abusive transactions. 174  At best, one should retain a
healthy skepticism toward claims that advance notice to the govern-
ment will have a significant impact in reducing abusive transactions.
Moreover, it is quite possible that the publicity surrounding the issu-
ance of a patent will allow the strategy to proliferate. As subsequently
discussed patents on tax strategies raise unique enforcement issues.175
Difficulties in enforcing such patents may lead to the appropriation of
the patented strategy without compensation.
The second argument that is made in support of the notion that the
patenting of tax strategies will result in less output of such strategies is
based on the fact that patents create monopolistic markets. The
granting of a patent transforms the market for the patented strategy
into a monopoly and monopolistic markets tend to produce subop-
timal output when compared to output that could be expected to re-
sult in a competitive market. In a competitive market the price of an
output is determined by the intersection of an upwardly sloping sup-
ply curve and a downwardly sloping demand curve. 176 In such a mar-
ket the output of an individual firm has no effect on price and an
174. Specific provisions of the Internal Revenue Code were interpreted through the issuance
of anti-abuse regulations. See Tanina Rostain, Sheltering Lawyers, The Organized Tax Bar and
the Tax Shelter Industry, 23 YALE J. ON REG. 77, 95 (2006) (citing to the DEP'T. OF THE TREA-
SURY, THE PROBLEM OF CORPORATE TAX SHELTERS: DISCUSSION, ANALYSIS AND LEGISLA-
TIVE PROPOSALS (July 1999)). In 2000, Temporary regulations were issued that required the
registration of confidential tax shelters, maintenance of investor lists, and tax return disclosure of
reportable transactions. See Temp. Treas. Reg. §§ 301.6111T-2T (2000); 301.6112-iT (2000);
Temp. Treas. Reg. § 301.6011-4T (2000). The reporting requirements were expanded by subse-
quent regulations. See Temp. Treas. Reg. § 301.6112-IT (2002); Temp. Treas. Reg. § 301.6011-4T
(2002). The American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, § 811-22, 118 Stat. 1418,
1575-87 (2004), further strengthened disclosure requirements, increased penalties for noncompli-
ance, and removed the reasonable cause exception for the imposition of penalties for transac-
tions that were not disclosed. Proposed regulations were recently issued implementing these
provisions. See supra note 158. The American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 also put to rest any
issues regarding the Treasury's authority to regulate the provision of legal advice with respect to
tax evasion or avoidance transactions or arrangements. See 31 U.S.C. § 330(d) (2000) (providing
that neither this section nor any other provision of law shall be construed to limit the authority
of the Treasury to impose standards applicable to the rendering of written advice with respect to
certain transactions or arrangements determined to have tax avoidance or evasion potential).
The Treasury imposed a due diligence requirement for legal opinions through revisions of Circu-
lar 230. See Regulations Governing Practice Before the Internal Revenue Service, 69 Fed. Reg.
75,839 (Dec. 20, 2004).
175. See infra notes 184-205 and accompanying text.
176. Increasing quantities of output are demanded as the price of that output decreases, hence
the downward slope of an aggregate demand curve on a graph where price is represented verti-
cally and quantity is represented horizontally. Conversely, increasing quantities of output are
produced as the price of such output increases. Consequently, the supply curve slopes upward.
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individual firm will produce output up to the point where the marginal
cost of producing additional output equals the price it can charge for
that output. 17 7 In a monopolistic market the monopolist is the mar-
ket. Unlike individual firms in a competitive market the output deci-
sions of the monopolist will impact price because the aggregate
demand curve is the firm's demand curve. Additional production by
the monopolist will lead to progressively less marginal revenue be-
cause in order to sell additional product the firm must reduce the
price charged to all buyers. As a consequence, marginal revenue for
the monopolist is always less than the price received for an additional
unit of output. At a certain point marginal revenue will equal margi-
nal cost and production will cease. This invariably results in less out-
put than would have been produced by firms in a competitive market.
In markets where the product consists of aggressive or abusive tax
strategies suboptimal output may be socially desirable.
However, certain attributes of the market for tax strategy may very
well mitigate the effects of monopoly on production. The marginal
cost of producing an additional tax shelter is probably close to zero. 178
The point at which the marginal revenue for licensing an additional
shelter exceeds its marginal cost may very well be close to the output
level that would be achieved in a competitive market. For example, it
is doubtful that Microsoft's virtual monopoly on operating systems,
which have very low marginal costs of production, has resulted in sig-
nificantly less operating systems being sold when compared to sales
that would have occurred in a competitive market for such systems.179
More importantly, however, is the ability of the monopolist in the tax
strategy market to engage in price discrimination. Price discrimina-
tion, the ability to charge different prices to different buyers, mitigates
the pricing problem for a monopolist and, in situations where perfect
price discrimination is possible, eliminates it entirely.180 Price discrim-
ination is possible in the absence of transactional transparency and
177. In a competitive market the demand curve for an individual firm is horizontal. That is,
the price is the same regardless of the level of output produced by the firm. In such a market the
price of the item is determined by aggregate supply and demand and the output decisions of an
individual firm have no effect on price.
178. Costs to develop a strategy may be significant. However, once developed, the marginal
cost of producing the shelter is minimal. In this respect the development of tax shelters is analo-
gous to the development of a drug or software product.
179. The marginal cost of producing another copy of Windows XP is minor. The significant
costs of production are the sunk costs of research and development.
180. Price differences that reflect varying costs of the output are not discriminatory. For ex-
ample, volume discounts or price increases for peak time usage may reflect cost differences in
supplying the product and, therefore, may not be discriminatory. See RICHARD G. LIPSEY, ET.
AL., ECONOMICS, 251-255 (10th ed. 1993).
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under circumstances under which buyers of the output cannot resell
it.181 Due to the confidential nature of tax information and tax advice
the likelihood that the patent holder can engage in price discrimina-
tion is high. Consequently, whether a monopolistic market for a tax
strategy will result in less use of that strategy is highly questionable.
It is difficult to predict whether the publicity attendant to the issu-
ance of patents will aid the Internal Revenue Service in its enforce-
ment efforts and, therefore, have a chilling effect on the development
of abusive or aggressive tax strategies. It is just as likely that the in-
ability to effectively enforce such patents will lead to increased use of
such strategies. Moreover, weak enforcement will likely overcome
any output reduction caused by the existence of a monopolistic mar-
ket, if, in fact, the monopolist would otherwise restrict output.182 The
proliferation of tax shelters, their use by high profile individuals and
corporations, and their marketing by prominent professional firms in
the face of significant legislative and administrative obstacles tends to
support a pessimistic opinion of what patented tax strategies will
spawn. 183
3. Increased Rent-Seeking and Rent Extraction
It is quite reasonable to expect that tax strategy patents, like tax
shelters, will flourish in the interstices of a detailed and complex set of
rules.18 4 Patents are granted for eligible subject matter that is useful,
novel, and nonobvious. 185 It may be reasonably inferred that, in order
to meet such requirements, the tax strategy in question will involve
the application and interrelationship of complex rules. Patented tax
strategies will not be designed for a single taxpayer but for a broad
enough market to justify their development costs. A searching inquiry
into whether such strategies are consistent with substantive tax princi-
181. See id. at 253.
182. See supra notes 180-181 and accompanying text.
183. Although aggressive tax planning has been part of the tax landscape since the tax sys-
tem's inception the use of abusive tax shelters has become a particularly vexing problem during
the past decade. Judicial doctrines emphasizing substance over form and business purpose, the
enactment of the passive activity loss rules as part of the landmark Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub.
L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (1986), and increased disclosure requirements and penalties proved
little match for market forces. The proliferation of tax shelters coincided with the conversion of
corporate tax departments into profit centers, the decline in profitability of audit services and
the concomitant movement into tax planning and consulting by the international accounting
firms, and a decline in Internal Revenue Service enforcement resources. See generally Rostain,
supra note 174, at 86-92.
184. Many tax shelters involve the application of the statutes and regulations governing part-
nerships, foreign source income, and foreign persons. These rules are noteworthy for their speci-
ficity and complexity. See Beale, supra note 150, at 587-91.
185. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
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pies is beside the point when the facts and circumstances peculiar to
an individual taxpayer are unknown. Strategies that meet the patenta-
bility standards of novelty and nonobviousness will likely have their
genesis in the structural infirmities of the Internal Revenue Code.
The business purpose of such strategies will most often be the result of
ex post rationalization. Resistance to tax simplification and reform is
likely to emanate from persons who stand to benefit from the issuance
of such patents.1 86
Tax strategy patents are unique in a significant respect from busi-
ness method patents in general. Their subject matter is made possible,
and may be rendered worthless, by legislative action. Tax law is noto-
riously fertile ground for rent seeking and rent extraction in the politi-
cal arena. For the past forty years the special interest model has been
generally accepted as the best representation of behavior in the politi-
cal arena.187 Legislation that affects large segments of a constituency
is less susceptible to rent seeking because collective action is difficult
due to free rider and coordination problems.18 8 Small groups with
much at stake tend to overcome these barriers. Rent seeking is most
effective when the form of tax in question imposes a heavy burden on
a small group. Rent extraction, rent seeking in reverse, is behavior by
legislators that generates political donations under threat of eliminat-
ing rents. Like rent seeking, such behavior is most effective when a
small, highly motivated group, is involved. 189
One need not be blessed with an inordinate amount of prescience to
predict that the ability to obtain patents on tax strategies will provide
enormous incentives to undertake rent seeking and extraction activi-
ties. A patent holder, or a prospective patent holder, will incur no
free rider or collective action problem because she is a monopolist or
has the potential to become one. Most, if not essentially all, tax strat-
egies that qualify for patent protection will affect a relatively small
group of taxpayers and advisors with significant sums at stake.
186. The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) has resisted various
tax reform proposals that it deemed infringing on a taxpayers entitlement to engage in tax mini-
mization. The AICPA has favored bright-line tests and specific rules over more individualistic
fact intensive approaches in combating abusive tax shelters. The accounting profession is a sig-
nificant participant in the marketing of tax shelters. See generally Rostain, supra note 174, at 88-
118.
187. McCaffrey & Cohen, supra note 137, at 1161.
188. Free riders are persons who receive benefits from an action without incurring the bur-
dens associated with the provision of the benefits received. Free rider problems are common
where benefits are available to a large, diffuse group. Coordination problems arise when the
costs associated with collective action exceed the benefits of such action. As the stakes increase
the benefits of collective action begin to outweigh the costs of coordination.
189. Id. at 1175-76.
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Rent seeking behavior can take various forms. Lobbyists for poten-
tial users of a tax strategy protected by a patent, for example, may
lobby for legislative changes that render the patent worthless while
maintaining the tax benefits in question in another form. Creative
ideas may spawn efforts to enact legislation that will allow such ideas
to blossom into patented tax strategies. Legislators may engage in
rent extraction by threatening to destroy the legislative underpinning
of a patented strategy or, alternatively, threatening not to do so. The
common perception that the well-heeled have influence over tax legis-
lation is one factor that has eroded social norms applicable to the vol-
untary assessment of tax liability. "The first fact of politics is that
politicians care about money. A lot." 190 The patentability of tax strat-
egies, by giving the inhabitants of Gucci Gulch and their brethren in
Congress another move in their rent seeking-extraction chess match,
will contribute to the erosion of social norms regarding tax
compliance. 191
4. Enforcement Issues
Finally, the difficulty of enforcing tax strategy patents will reinforce
perceptions that the tax system is unfair and lacks transparency. A
loss of privacy is inherent in the collection of information by the gov-
ernment to administer the tax laws. Although the gathering of such
information is constitutionally permissible unwarranted disclosures of
such information by the government may implicate constitutional is-
sues and do damage to a system that relies heavily on voluntary re-
porting. 192 In the aftermath of the Watergate scandal and the
opprobrium generated by the Nixon Administration's enlistment of
the Internal Revenue Service to further its political goals tax returns
and tax return information were made confidential. 193 Among others,
190. Id. at 1167.
191. The term "Gucci Gulch" was popularized by two newspaper reporters in a book recount-
ing the passage of the landmark Tax Reform Act of 1986. See JEFFREY H. BIRNBAUM & ALAN S.
MURRAY, SHOWDOWN AT Gucci GULCH (1988).
192. See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977) (holding a New York state law requiring physi-
cians to report certain information concerning prescription drugs did not violate the constitu-
tion). The Court did indicate that constitutional concerns may be implicated if unwarranted
disclosures were made or by the existence of a system that failed to contain adequate security
against such disclosure. Id. at 605-06.
193. See I.R.C. § 6103(a) (2006). Prior to the amendments made to § 6103 by The Tax Reform
Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520 (1976), the President had access to tax return
information by Executive Order or through regulations approved by the President. The Nixon
Administration was not the first administration to use tax information for political purposes.
Presidents Kennedy and Eisenhower reportedly were not above using similar tactics. See Cythia
Blum, The Flat Tax: A Panacea For Privacy Concerns, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 1241, 1269 n.103, 1270
n.108.
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no officer or employee of the United States may disclose any return or
return information unless specifically authorized by the statute. 194
Statutory exceptions to the confidentiality requirement are limited
and include limited disclosures for state tax and state and local law
enforcement,' 95 disclosures to Committees of Congress,' 96 disclosures
for statistical use,197 disclosures pursuant to presidential requests,198
and confirmation of Presidential appointees to executive and judicial
branch positions.1 99 Willful unauthorized disclosures are punishable
by fines and incarceration and dismissal from office.2 00  Moreover,
civil actions may be brought against the United States for knowing or
negligent unauthorized disclosures.201 In addition to restrictions on
disclosures of returns and return information, legislation protects tax-
payers from unauthorized inspection of returns.20 2 These anti-brows-
ing provisions were in enacted in response to evidence that Internal
Revenue Service employees were browsing taxpayer records for no
legitimate purpose.20 3
In addition to the confidentiality requirements imposed on the gov-
ernment, much tax advice will be protected from disclosure by attor-
ney-client privilege, 20 4 work product doctrine protection,205and ethical
194. I.R.C. § 6103(a)(1) (2006). The term "return" is broadly defined to include supporting
schedules, attachments, and other supplements to the filed return. I.R.C. § 6103(b)(1) (2006).
The term "return information" is also broadly defined and encompasses, in part, the taxpayer's
identity, the nature, source, and amount of income, deductions, credits, liabilities, and net worth.
I.R.C. § 6103(b)(2) (2006).
195. I.R.C. § 6103(d) (2006).
196. I.R.C. § 6103(f) (2006).
197. I.R.C. § 61030) (2006).
198. I.R.C. § 6103(g)(1) (2006). The request must be personally signed by the President and,
among other requirements, indicate the specific reason the disclosure is requested. The President
must report all such requests quarterly to the Joint Committee on Taxation. Id.
199. I.R.C. § 6103(g)(2) (2006).
200. I.R.C. § 7213(a) (2006).
201. I.R.C. § 7431(a)(1) (2006).Executive branch officials are also prohibited, under threat of
criminal sanction, from requesting the Internal Revenue Service to conduct or terminate an au-
dit or other investigation. See I.R.C. § 7217 (2006).
202. I.R.C. § 7213(a) (2006). Violation of the statute could result in criminal prosecution and
the imposition of fines and a prison term of up to one year. I.R.C. § 7213(b) (2006). Moreover,
civil damages may be awarded as a result of unauthorized inspection. See I.R.C. § 7431(a)
(2006).
203. The anti-browsing provisions were enacted in 1997 through the Taxpayer Browsing Pro-
tection Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-35, 111 Stat. 1104 (1997). The legislation did not appear to
have an immediate effect on such activities. See Blum, supra note 193, at 1275 n.124 (citing to a
report issued by the Joint Committee on Taxation in 2000 that reported the Treasury substanti-
ated 198 cases of unauthorized browsing in the two years following the enactment of the
prohibition).
204. Attorney-client privilege attaches to legal advice and is subject to several exceptions.
One exception is that attorney-client privilege does not apply to communications relating to tax
return preparation. Some courts have held that tax return preparation is not legal advice while
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requirements. 206 Moreover, privilege has been extended to account-
ants and other practitioners before the Internal Revenue Service. 20 7
Enforcement of patents will be difficult in this environment. Al-
though it is possible that measures may be taken to achieve broad
dissemination of existing patents it is unlikely that the veil of confi-
dentiality surrounding tax returns and tax advice will be lifted to such
an extent that patent holders can determine, with any degree of confi-
others have held there taxpayers have no expectation of privacy with respect to information
reported on a tax return or have waived the privilege. See Beale, supra note 150, at 634-36. The
legislative history of The Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub.
L. No. 105-206, 112 Stat. 685, which extended the privilege to non-attorneys, expressly adopted
this position. See H. Rep. No. 105-599, 105th Cong. (1998). See infra note 199 and accompanying
text.
205. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3). The work product doctrine protects documents prepared in
anticipation of litigation from discovery unless there is showing of substantial need for such
documents and that substantially equivalent materials cannot be obtained elsewhere without
undue hardship. The Second Circuit has held that the doctrine applies to documents assessing
the likely result of expected litigation even though the primary purpose of the documents was to
assess the desirability of a business transaction. See U.S. v. Adlman, 134 F.3d 1194 (2d Cir. 1998).
206. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2003); MODEL CODE OF PROF'L
RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101 (1980). Ethical rules applicable to certified public accountants also
require the maintenance of client confidences. See AM. INST. OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC Accr. CODE
OF PROF'L CONDUCT R 301 (amended 1992).
207. The Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-
206, 112 Stat. 685 added § 7525 to the Internal Revenue Code. This provision extends the com-
mon law attorney-client privilege to federally authorized tax practitioners. This statutory privi-
lege is narrower, however, than the common law privilege attaching to attorney-client
communications. The privilege applies only to tax advice and does not extend to communica-
tions regarding criminal matters nor tax shelter promotion activities. Moreover, the statutory
protection does not prevent disclosure to federal regulatory bodies other than the Internal Reve-
nue Service. For an analysis of the statute see Matthew A. Melone, New Privilege and Burden of
Proof Rules: Caution is Advisable, 16 J. TAX. OF INVESTMENTS 237 (1999). The work product
doctrine does not apply to accountants' tax accrual workpapers as a result of the decision in U.S.
v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805 (1984). Financial statements prepared according to gener-
ally accepted accounting principles include accruals for current taxes due and deferred taxes.
Auditor workpapers often include a candid analysis of tax positions taken by the client. Despite
the Supreme Court's decision in Arthur Young & Co., the Internal Revenue Service does not
seek such workpapers as a matter of course. See Ann. 84-46, 1984-18 I.R.B. 18 (April 30, 1984).
Several states have enacted accountant-client privilege statutes. For a comprehensive analysis of
state law privileges see Denzil Causey & Frances McNair, An Analysis of State Accountant-Client
Privilege Statutes and Public Policy Implications for the Accountant-Client Relationship, 27 AM.
Bus. L.J. 535 (1990). Recent changes to financial accounting reporting rules, effective for fiscal
years beginning after Dec. 15, 2006, impose a more-likely-than-not recognition standard for re-
porting the effect of tax positions on financial statements. Moreover, the new rules impose addi-
tional disclosure requirements with respect to income taxes. See ACCOUNTING FOR
UNCERTAINTY IN INCOME TAXES - AN INTERPRETATION OF FASB STATEMENT No. 109, FASB
Interpretation No. 48 (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 2006). The new rules have generated criti-
cism from business quarters and sought, unsuccessfully, to have the effective date of the rules
postponed. See David Reilly, Accounting Rules Won't Be Delayed, WALL ST. J., Jan. 18, 2007, at
C3; Gretchen Morgenson, A Tax Secret Emerges From the Murk, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 2007, § 3,
at 1.
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dence, whether, and to what extent, infringement has occurred. 208 It
is likely that patent enforcement will be haphazard and depend to a
significant extent on the nature of the patent itself, the degree to
which patent holders take prophylactic measures, 20 9 and the integrity
of taxpayers and their advisors - a factor that should not be taken for
granted. The position taken by one tax planner is instructive:
Until the issue is resolved, tax planners, like myself, face a constant
risk that we could infringe someone's patent with an innovative
planning technique, unless we do a patent search first, which we
won't, because isn't cost effective and isn't likely to be discovered by
the patent holder even if it is infringing.2 10
The effect that the nature of the patented tax strategy can have on
enforcement is illustrated by a pending patent infringement case in-
volving the transfer of compensatory stock options to a grantor re-
tained annuity trust.211 The transferor owned options on publicly
traded stock and the transfer was reported in a filing with the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission. That the alleged infringement oc-
curred in a transaction that was subject to public reporting under the
federal securities laws was fortuitous for the patent holder, but it is
unlikely that transactions not subject to such reporting would have
been detected. The nature of the patent, involving stock options and
wealthy individuals, implicated the securities markets and high level
executives - usually a trigger for reporting obligations. Most tax strat-
egy patents will not operate in an environment subject to public re-
porting. "[T]ransparency is quite limited in the area of tax, which
208. One scholar has proposed the development of an information distribution system to in-
form tax practitioners of patented tax strategies. See Statement of Richard S. Gruner, Professor of
Law, Whittier Law School, Costa Mesa, California, Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Select
Revenue Measures of the Committee on Ways & Means, July 13, 2006.
209. For example, patent holders may soon be seen lurking the corridors at various tax confer-
ences eager to inform the participants that they hold the patent on the tax strategy on the confer-
ences' agenda.
210. Andrew Oh-Willeke, Tax Shelter Patent Case Update, WASH PARK PROPHET,(2006), at
http://washparkprophet.blogspot.com/2006_10_17_archive.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2007) (em-
phasis provided).
211. Wealth Transfer Group v. Rowe, No. 3:06cv24 (D. Conn. filed Jan. 6, 2006). Grantor
retained annuity trusts are commonly used estate planning vehicles. Such trusts, which are irrev-
ocable, are typically funded by the grantor with assets that are expected to appreciate. The gran-
tor receives an annuity for a term of years with the remainder interest residing with a
beneficiary, usually a family member. Because of the retained annuity interest the value of the
gift, for gift tax purposes, is determined by subtracting the present value of the retained interest
from the value of the transferred property. See generally I.R.C. § 2702 (2006). The discount rate
for determining such present value is statutorily established. See I.R.C. § 7520 (2006). It is possi-
ble to set the annuity rate to a level that effectively "zero's out" the remainder interest. See
Walton v. Comm'r., 115 T.C. 589 (Tax Ct. 2000). In order for the grantor retained annuity trust
to have its intended effect, however, the grantor must outlive the term of the annuity. See I.R.C.
§ 2036(a) (2006).
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remains largely a black box. ' 212 It would not come as a surprise if
many patent infringement disputes occur between advisors for the
same taxpayer, most likely between the attorneys and the certified
public accountants.
To many taxpayers patent enforcement will appear to be random or
applicable only to those taxpayers unlucky enough to be caught. Tax-
payer's perceptions that the tax system is gamed and subject to manip-
ulation have had corrosive effects on the voluntary compliance
system.213 These perceptions will be reinforced by the existence of
patents whose enforcement is perceived to be random, unfair, or sub-
ject to manipulation.
C. The Illusory Benefits of Tax Strategy Patents
The patent system is rooted in utilitarian grounds. It is designed to
foster innovation at a cost well worth the benefits is generates. Tax
law practitioners require no assistance or further incentive to inno-
vate. "The tax bar is the repository of the greatest ingenuity in
America, and given the chance, those people will do you in."' 214 The
tax law field is abundantly supplied with literature and conferences
and staffed with persons motivated by the desire to perform at the
highest levels of the profession. Perhaps more importantly, the nature
of the practice will assure ample incentives to innovate. Lawyers are
duty bound to serve their client. By its nature tax practice involves
client money and lots of it.215 Tax practitioners have innovated since
the enactment of the first income tax. In fact, the incentives to inno-
vate in this area of law are so pervasive that the accounting industry
has become a major competitor to law firms in serving client needs.
For most of their existence the core service of the large accounting
firms was the independent audit.216 During the 1990s, as competitive
pressures continued to exert themselves with greater force on their
212. Drucker, supra note 146, at C3 (quoting Mark Everson, the Commissioner of the Internal
Revenue Service, discussing the difficulty of ascertaining a company's tax position from informa-
tion provided in public filings).
213. See supra notes 144-150 and accompanying text.
214. Beale, supra note 150 at 584 (quoting Professor Martin D. Ginsburg of Georgetown Uni-
versity Law Center in a statement before the Subcomm. On Select Revenue Measures of the
H.Comm. on Ways & Means, 97th Cong. 90 (1982)).
215. Corporate tax departments have come under increasing management scrutiny and, to a
certain extent, have come to be seen as profit centers. See Joseph Bankman, The New Market for
Tax Shelters, 83 Tax Notes 1775, 1784 (1999).
216. After the post-Enron demise of Arthur Andersen & Co., the large accounting firms are
Price Waterhouse Coopers, Deloitte & Touche, KPMG, and Ernst & Young. Collectively, the
large firms were once known as the Big Eight, then as a result of mergers, the Big Six, the Big
Five, and finally, after Arthur Andersen's implosion, the Final Four.
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audit practices, the provision of tax services became an increasingly
important revenue source for these firms. 217 The profit potential in
tax services led the firms to actively recruit tax attorneys and recent
law school graduates and specialized tax groups were created to de-
velop tax products that would eventually be supported by significant
marketing efforts.21 8 In the year 2002, the tax service revenue gener-
ated by the large accounting firms exceeded one billion dollars.219
The increasing profitability of such services led to criticism that such
services were jeopardizing the independence required of such firms in
the conduct of their audits.220 Much of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, passed in the wake of the Enron and World Com scandals, fo-
cused on the independent audit function and the provision of non-
audit services.221
Moreover, the notion that patents are necessary for innovation in
the tax law area is belied by fact that restrictions are imposed on tax
217. Rostain, supra note 174, at 89-90.
218. Id. at 90-91.
219. Id. at 91.
220. According to regulatory filings by twenty-one of the thirty companies whose stock com-
prise the Dow Jones Industrial Average, almost seventy-five percent of fees paid to accountants
in 2001 were for nonaudit services. See Cassell Bryan-Low, Accounting Firms Are Still Consult-
ing, WALL ST. J., Sept. 23, 2002, at C1. Significant increases in consulting revenue caused tre-
mendous turmoil within the firms particularly with respect to compensation and governance
roles. The increased importance of tax revenues to the profitability of the firms has not, as of yet,
led to similar problems. See Cassell Bryan-Lowe, Deloitte Chief Wrestles to Get Consultants Back
in Firms, WALL ST. J. , Aug. 14, 2003, at Cl; Reed Abelson, After Andersen War, Accountants
Think Hard About Consulting, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9, 2000, at C1.
221. The legislation, inter alia, created the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board
(P.C.A.O.B) and vested it with significant enforcement powers. The legislation also limited the
scope of non-audit services that an accounting firm may provide to audit clients, instituted
mandatory audit partner rotation, and prohibited accounting firms from auditing a public com-
pany if certain officers of that company were employed by the accounting firm during the one
year period preceding the audit. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, §§ 101-
301, 116 Stat. 745, 750-775 (2002) (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., 28
U.S.C.). The P.C.A.O.B. is not an agency of the U.S. government nor are any members or em-
ployees of the P.C.A.O.B. considered officers, employees, or agents of the U.S. government. Id.
at § 101(b). The Securities and Exchange Commission has oversight and enforcement authority
over the P.C.A.O.B. Id. at § 107. The P.C.A.O.B. issued rules in 2005, approved by the S.E.C. in
2006, that implement the legislation's prohibition on the provision of non-audit services. Under
these rules the provision of tax compliance, tax planning, and tax advisory services is permitted if
such services are preapproved by the client's audit committee. However, auditor independence
is deemed compromised by the provision of services to an audit client related to the marketing,
planning, or opining in favor of the tax treatment of confidential or aggressive tax position trans-
actions or by the rendering of any tax service to a person that is in a financial oversight role at
the audit client. See BYLAWS AND RULES OF THE PUB. Co. Accr. OVERSIGHT BD. § 3, subpart 1,
R 3522-24 (2006). See also Matthew J. Barrett, In the Wake of Corporate Reform: One Year in the
Life of Sarbanes-Oxley - A Critical Review Symposium Issue: "Tax Services" as a Trojan Horse in
the Auditor Independence Provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 463, 474-76
(2004).
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practitioners in an effort to counter existing incentives. The prolifera-
tion of tax shelters and aggressive tax strategies evidenced that incen-
tives for creativity in the tax field were resistant to long-standing
judicial doctrines emphasizing substance over form and business pur-
pose, the enactment of the passive activity loss rules as part of the
landmark Tax Reform Act of 1986,222 and increased disclosure re-
quirements and penalties. Temporary regulations were issued in 2000
that required the registration of confidential tax shelters, maintenance
of investor lists, and tax return disclosure of reportable transac-
tions.223 The American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 further strength-
ened disclosure requirements, increased penalties for noncompliance,
and removed the reasonable cause exception for the imposition of
penalties for transactions that were not disclosed. 224 This legislation
also made clear that the Treasury had the authority to regulate the
provision of legal advice with respect to tax evasion or avoidance
transactions or arrangements. 225 In addition, the Treasury imposed a
due diligence requirement for legal opinions through its revisions of
Circular 230.226
In contrast to those charged with developing and improving meth-
ods of doing business in general the developers of tax strategies have
unique incentives that depend not a wit on the ability to obtain propri-
etary protection for their creations. Significant amounts of money are
typically at stake. Along with the tax dollars, the desire of practition-
ers to maintain or enhance their professional reputations and their
fidelity to their client service duties have provided more than ample
incentive for innovation in the tax field.
222. Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (1986).
223. See Temp. Treas. Reg. § 301.6111T-2T (2000); Temp. Treas. Reg. § 301.6112-T (2000);
Temp. Treas. Reg. § 301.6011-4T (2000). The reporting requirements were expanded by subse-
quent regulations. See Temp. Treas. Reg. § 301.6112-IT (2002); Temp. Treas. Reg. § 301.6011-4T
(2002).
224. Pub. L. No. 108-357, § 811-22, 118 Stat. 1418, 1575-87 (2004). Proposed regulations were
recently issued that would implement the statutory changes. See Treas. Reg. § 301.6111-3 (pro-
posed Nov. 2, 2006) (to be codified at 71 Fed. Reg. 64496); Treas. Reg. § 301.6112-1 (proposed
Nov. 2, 2006) (to be codified at 71 Fed. Reg. 64501).
225. See 31 U.S.C. § 330(d) (2000) (providing that neither this section nor any other provision
of law shall be construed to limit the authority of the Treasury to impose standards applicable to
the rendering of written advice with respect to certain transactions or arrangements determined
to have tax avoidance or evasion potential).
226. See Regulations Governing Practice Before the Internal Revenue Service, 69 Fed. Reg.
75,839 (Dec. 20, 2004). At least one practitioner has asserted that these regulations amount to an
unwarranted regulation of professional speech. See David T. Moldenhauer, Circular 230 Stan-
dard, Legal Ethics and First Amendment Limitations on the Regulation of Professional Speech by
Lawyers, 29 SEA-IrLE U. L. REV. 843 (2006).
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D. Law as Patentable Subject Matter
Many people, myself included, find it disturbing that a patent may
be issued for a tax strategy. After all, a tax strategy involves the appli-
cation of law and, at an instinctual level, the notion that someone may
have proprietary rights to a method of accomplishing an objective that
is contained in the statute books runs counter to strongly held notions
of fairness. However, a reasoned justification for the reflexive aver-
sion to such patents is difficult to articulate. One may attempt to
equate legislation with laws of nature. Such laws exist in the commons
and resist propertization. They are discovered, not invented. How-
ever, justification of a bar to patents on tax strategies by resort to
analogies to laws of nature is not satisfactory for two reasons. First,
legislative enactments, quite obviously, are laws of man and not of
nature. Secondly, although laws of nature are not patentable, novel or
nonobvious uses of the laws of nature or combinations thereof, pro-
ducing a useful result, are patentable subject matter. Under what ra-
tionale could we deny a patent on similarly novel and nonobvious uses
of the tax law?
Justification for prohibiting tax strategy patents may be rooted in
the belief that all taxpayers are entitled to use all available legal
means to minimize their tax obligations. This belief, often referred to
as the tax minimization norm, has been famously articulated by Judge
Learned Hand. "Anyone may so arrange his affairs that his taxes
shall be as low as possible; he is not bound to choose that pattern
which will best pay the Treasury; there is not even a patriotic duty to
increase one's taxes. ' 227 In a later case, Judge Hand, in a dissenting
opinion, stated that "there is nothing sinister in so arranging one's af-
fairs as to keep taxes as low as possible. Everybody does so, rich and
poor; and all do right, for nobody owes any public duty to pay more
than the law demands: taxes are enforced exactions, not voluntary
contributions. To demand more in the name of morals is mere
cant"
2 2 8
This rationale, however, is unsatisfactory even if one accepts the
validity of the tax minimization norm.229 The issuance of tax strategy
patents does not prevent taxpayers from using all available means to
legally reduce their taxes nor does it reduce the arsenal of tax minimi-
227. Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809, 810 (2d Cir. 1934).
228. Comm'r. v. Newman, 159 F.2d 848, 850-51 (2d Cir. 1947) (Hand, J., dissenting).
229. It has been argued that the notion that taxpayers are entitled to use all available means
to minimize their taxes has contributed to the proliferation of tax shelters and aggressive tax
strategies and has had a profoundly negative effect on the reputation of the tax bar. See infra
notes 162-175 and accompanying text.
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zation strategies that may be employed. Such patents require a tax-
payer to pay someone for the privilege of engaging in tax
minimization. To date no one has asserted that all taxpayers must
have equal access to tax minimization techniques. Such an assertion
would be tantamount to a call for equal access to good tax advice.
Common sense informs us that taxpayers with greater resources have
access to the best tax lawyers. I see no principled distinction between
the payment of exorbitant hourly rates to a good tax lawyer and li-
censing fees to a patent holder.
The solution to the problem caused by the possibility that a patent
holder would refuse to license the strategy to a taxpayer can be found
by analogy to similar problems encountered by the issuance of patents
on inventions that implicate industry standards. Patent rights are vital
to an innovation that becomes a de facto industry standard. De facto
standards have their genesis in the marketplace and typically arise in
markets with significant network externalities that result in a direct
correlation between the value of a product and the number of users of
a product. 230 Examples of such standards include the Windows oper-
ating system and the QWERTY keyboard layout. 231 The availability
of patent protection is particularly important to innovations that are
capable of becoming de facto standards in the industry in question.
232
The issuance of patents for innovations that implicate govern-
ment-mandated standards - de jure standards - has, however,
spawned significant criticism.2 33 Some commentators have urged that
patents not be issued for such innovations, while others have proposed
that such standards be treated as "essential facilities" under the anti-
trust laws, thereby requiring the patent holder to provide access to the
patented invention on nondiscriminatory terms.234 In certain situa-
tions involving public health and welfare standards the courts have
refused to enforce intellectual property rights and, with respect to mil-
itary procurement, the United States was entitled to procure the tech-
nology in question on a nonexclusive, royalty-bearing basis.235
The refusal by a patent holder to license a tax strategy is not quite
the same as the refusal to license technology that is required to meet a
governmentally-imposed standard. A taxpayer is not required, by law
230. See Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan, Legal Implications of Network Economic Ef-
fects, 86 CAL. L. REV. 479, 481 (1998).
231. See Mueller, supra note 6, at 633 n.52.
232. Id. at 652.
233. Industry standards promulgated by industry groups, as opposed to government promul-
gated standards, implicate similar issues but with less force. See id at 664-69.
234. Id. at 655-56.
235. Id. at 660-62.
[Vol. 5:437
PATENTING OF TAX STRATEGIES
or regulation, to implement a particular tax strategy. However, if, as a
matter of public policy, it is believed desirable for all taxpayers, sub-
ject to their ability and willingness to pay, to have access to a particu-
lar method of structuring their financial affairs to achieve a desired tax
result, then precedent exists for achieving this aim.
To this point, it appears there is nothing particularly unique about
tax strategies that would support a non-utilitarian justification for de-
nying them subject-matter eligibility. Yet, an unshakeable sense of
uneasiness surrounds the possibility of granting a person a proprietary
interest over the use of legislation, however novel and non-obvious.
The ability to obtain patents on tax strategies commodifies the law
and treats it no differently than a process for handling customer or-
ders or a tool that is instrumental in a manufacturing process. How-
ever, law is an achievement and represents:
[T]he final settlement of contested issues . . . with a view toward
enabling coordinated action in our highly complex, pluralistic soci-
ety .... [T]he function of law is to secure the conditions necessary
for cooperation and the realization of collective goods, notwith-
standing deep and persistent disagreements over values, ends, con-
ceptions of the good, and the application of moral principles to
practical situations. 236
In a representative democracy, the law is created for the polity as a
whole and performs distinctive work. The law in such political sys-
tems is "a just and reasonable expression of the public will, and of
government, as instituted by popular consent and for the general good
... 237 Effective legal rules are seen as legitimate in and of them-
selves; they provide for the ordering of resources and the provision of
collective goods by precluding resort to non-legal principles that re-
sulted in the very disagreements the law was meant to resolve. That
the law belongs to the commons is a notion recognized long ago by
Thomas Aquinas. "The law is nothing else than an ordinance of rea-
son for the common good, promulgated by him who has care of the
community. '238 The fact that the law, tax law especially, has grown
into a colossus of such Byzantine complexity that would allow a per-
son to assert, with a straight face, that she invented a strategy worthy
of patent protection is an indictment of the legislative process.
The unique nature of law is evidenced by the responsibility of the
legal profession to the institutions of law. The American Bar Associa-
236. W. Bradley Wendel, Professionalism As Interpretation, 99 Nw. U. L. REV. 1167, 1169,
1208 (2005).
237. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 532 (1884).
238. AUSTIN FAGOTHEY, S.J., RIGHT AND REASON 108 (The C.V. Mosby Company 6th ed.
1976) (quoting ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA I-I1, q. 90, a. 4).
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tion has recognized the unique and varied responsibilities of tax law-
yers.239 In addition to functioning as client representatives, lawyers
are also officers of the legal system.240 These responsibilities are the
cause of the angst suffered by the tax bar over its role in the prolifera-
tion of tax shelters. Members of the tax bar and legal scholars have
challenged the "tax minimization" norm that pervades tax practice
and have attacked hyper-textual approaches to tax law interpreta-
tion.241 One scholar posits that tax shelter reform efforts have been
driven, in part, by segments of the bar that wish to reassert their au-
thority as guardians of the tax system. 242
In addition to commodifying the law, patents on tax strategies pre-
sent a significant infringement on the lawyer-client relationship. Vari-
ous infringements exist on a lawyer's autonomy to serve her client. As
officers of the court, lawyers are subject to control by the judiciary.
Professional codes of conduct limit lawyers' autonomy, as do statutes
that protect the public from unfair business practices. 243 The
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 ordered the Securities and Exchange
Commission to issue regulations that address a lawyer's obligation to
report material violations of securities law to certain committees of
the client's board of directors or to the full board.244
Lawyers also receive no special exemptions from the application of
the plethora of statutory requirements that deal with discrimination,
workplace safety, pensions, and myriad other issues affecting busi-
nesses in general. Insurers also exercise considerable control over
lawyers by requiring, as a condition to the issuance and maintenance
of insurance, the implementation of certain administrative or manage-
rial procedures in the running of the insured practice. 245 However,
the limitation imposed by the existence of patents is unprecedented.
239. LisH WHITSON, TASK FORCE ON THE MODEL DEFINITION OF THE PRACTICE OF LAW
STANDING COMMITTEE ON CLIENT PROTECTION 6-7 (Am. Bar Assoc. 2003), available at http://
www.abanet.org/cpr/model-def/taskforce rpt 803.pdf (last visited April 10, 2007).
240. Id. See also MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT 1.1 pmbl. (2003) and Eugene R. Gaetke,
Expecting Too Much and Too Little of Lawyers, 67 U. Prrr. L. REV. 693 (2006).
241. See Beale, supra note 150, at 586-603; Wendell, supra note 236, at 1211-18; and Mortimer
Caplin, Special Feature: The Tax Lawyer's Role in the Way the American Tax System Works, 24
VA. TAX REV. 969 (2005).
242. Rostain, supra note 174, at 113-14.
243. Statutory limitations may be directed specifically at lawyers. See 49 U.S.C. § 1136(g)(2)
(2000) (prohibiting lawyers from making unsolicited contact with survivors or victims' families
for 45 days after an airplane accident).
244. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 784 (2002) (codified at 15
U.S.C. § 7245 (2006)).
245. See generally James M. Fischer, External Control Over the American Bar, 19 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 59, 63-95 (2006) (discussing various "best practices" that insurers insist the in-
sured practice implement, such as the use of written retainers, institution of conflict-checking
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Unlike the aforementioned limitations, this limitation is both noncon-
sensual and imposed by a private citizen. A lawyer's response to a
client that "my best legal advice is owned by someone else" is plausi-
ble and would be accurate.
IV. CONCLUSION
Tax strategy patents are subject to many of the criticisms directed
toward business method patents in general. In certain respects, pat-
ents on tax strategies suffer less from the alleged infirmities applicable
to business method patents as a class. However, tax strategy patents
merit little, if any, of the utilitarian-based justifications that underpin
the issuance of patents. Incentives for innovation in the tax field are
plentiful and, in this respect, little is to be gained by the issuance of
patents. The costs of such patents, however, are significant. Increased
complexity, encouragement of abusive and aggressive tax positions,
increased rent-seeking and rent extraction, and uneven enforcement
are likely to contribute to the polity's sense that the tax system is un-
fair and arbitrary. In light of the dubious benefits to be obtained from
such patents, these costs are unacceptably high, particularly when one
considers the importance of the tax system and its heavy dependence
on voluntary taxpayer compliance. Moreover, such patents, in effect,
treat the law similarly to other impediments or obstacles faced by bus-
iness, thereby ignoring the unique nature of the law. Discerning
whether an invention merely facilitates the employment of tax strate-
gies or monopolizes tax strategies may prove difficult. Line-drawing,
however, is often difficult and, if such difficulty had regularly been
used as a reason not to act, the statute books would be much less
voluminous.
procedures, maintenance of calendars, and the implementation of adequate controls over client
trust accounts).
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